# 1NC

### 1

#### Reject the aff’s coercive politics

Younkins 2k (Dr. Edward W. Younkins, Professor of Accountancy and Business Administration at Wheeling Jesuit University in West Virginia, “Civil Society: The Realm of Freedom,” No 63, 6-10-2000, http://www.quebecoislibre.org/000610-11.htm, JMP)

Recently (and ironically), government projects and programs have been started to restore civil society through state subsidization or coercive mandates. Such coercion cannot create true voluntary associations. Statists who support such projects believe only in the power of political society – they don't realize that the subsidized or mandated activity can be performed voluntarily through the private interaction of individuals and associations. They also don't understand that to propose that an activity not be performed coercively, is not to oppose the activity, but simply its coercion.

If civil society is to be revived, we must substitute voluntary cooperation for coercion and replace mandates with the rule of law. According to the Cato Handbook for Congress, Congress should:

before trying to institute a government program to solve a problem, investigate whether there is some other government program that is causing the problem ... and, if such a program is identified, begin to reform or eliminate it;

ask by what legal authority in the Constitution Congress undertakes an action ...;

recognize that when government undertakes a program, it displaces the voluntary efforts of others and makes voluntary association in civil society appear redundant, with significant negative effects; and

begin systematically to abolish or phase out those government programs that do what could be accomplished by voluntary associations in civil society ... recognizing that accomplishment through free association is morally superior to coercive mandates, and almost always generates more efficient outcomes.

Every time taxes are raised, another regulation is passed, or another government program is adopted, we are acknowledging the inability of individuals to govern themselves. It follows that there is a moral imperative for us to reclaim our right to live in a civil society, rather than to have bureaucrats and politicians « solve » our problems and run our lives.

### 2

#### Oil prices are stable and are trending upwards

Fathi 11/17 (Saadalah al Fathi, 11/17/13, Alwababa, What does OPEC think about the future of oil?, http://www.albawaba.com/business/opec-534141, HSA)

The new ‘World Oil Outlook’ report from Opec, according to its secretary-general Abdullah Salem Al Badri, “aims to share Opec’s views on the world’s energy prospects, and its associated challenges and opportunities.” The report, in its seventh edition, “discusses the principal issues that could shape the future of the global energy markets, particularly in relation to oil.”¶ The report assumes oil prices to remain stable in the long run as the rising cost of the marginal barrel would prevent their drop and, therefore, in nominal terms, a $110 per barrel on average up to 2020 and then rising gradually to $160 a barrel by 2035...which is only $100 a barrel in real terms.¶ Economic growth will always be the main driver of the energy market and there are signs of an improving outlook such as the fact that the average annual growth is expected to be 3.8 per cent up to 2018 and 3.5 per cent for the rest of the period.¶ The world population of seven billion in 2012 is forecast by the UN to increase to 8.6 billion in 2035, with 63 per cent living in cities and, therefore, dependent on energy and oil requirements.¶ Energy policy, especially in developed countries, the encouragement for the use of biofuels, environmental policies skewed against fossil fuels and the high level of taxation on petroleum products would all impact the forecasts. Take for example the EU’s aim of using 10 per cent biofuel in its energy mix by 2020. This is highly questionable with the European Parliament looking at 6 per cent only.

#### Most recent reports prove this trend is sustainable

Saefong and Reklaitis 14

Myra and Victor, 1/15/14, “Oil tops $94 to close at a nearly two-week high”

<http://www.marketwatch.com/story/oil-futures-slip-ahead-of-us-crude-supply-data-2014-01-15>, VR

February crude oil rose $1.58, or 1.7%, to settle at $94.17 a barrel on the [New York Mercantile Exchange](http://www.marketwatch.com/companies/New_York_Mercantile_Exchange?lc=int_mb_1001). Prices were trading around $93.50 before the government supply data were released. They scored their highest close since Jan. 2, according to Oil rigs extract petroleum in the U.S. U.S. [Energy Information Administration reported](http://ir.eia.gov/wpsr/wpsrsummary.pdf) that crude supplies dropped by 7.7 million barrels for the week ended Jan. 10. Analysts polled by Platts were expecting a decline of 1.6 million barrels, while the [American Petroleum Institute late Tuesday](http://www.marketwatch.com/story/api-data-show-crude-supply-down-41-mln-barrels-2014-01-14) reported a fall of 4.1 million barrels. The EIA’s reported weekly decline for crude inventories was its seventh in a row. Including the latest figure, crude-oil inventories, as reported by the EIA, have tallied a drop of roughly 41.2 million barrels in seven weeks. [Last week](http://www.marketwatch.com/story/oil-futures-rise-amid-libyan-tensions-2014-01-08), the government said supplies fell 2.7 million barrels for the week ended Jan. 3. The data also revealed a larger-than-expected increase in gasoline supply. Gasoline stockpiles climbed 6.2 million barrels, while distillate inventories fell by 1 million barrels, the EIA said. Gasoline stockpiles were expected to climb 1.7 million barrels while distillate supplies were expected to increase by 1.3 million barrels, according to the Platts poll. February heating oil climbed 4 cents, or 1.5%, to $2.98 a gallon, while February added less than half a penny, or 0.2%, to $2.63 a gallon. Following the large draw in crude-oil inventory levels, the market has held on to its gains throughout the session, said John Macaluso, research analyst at Tyche Capital Advisors. “Nymex crude oil closed at its highest point in a couple of weeks despite the higher-than-expected build in gasoline inventories.” But “with the recent strength in the U.S dollar we would not be surprised to see some profit taking in the upcoming days — especially after the selloffs we have seen the last couple of weeks,” he said. The U.S. dollar index [climbed Wednesday](http://www.marketwatch.com/story/dollar-strengthens-on-empire-state-survey-2014-01-15) after news that manufacturing activity in the New York region this month picked up steam. A stronger dollar tends to pressure prices for dollar-denominated commodities. The upbeat manufacturing data, however, bode well for the energy-demand outlook and helped support oil prices. In addition, [overall producer prices advanced in line with expectations](http://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-producer-prices-climbs-04-in-december-2014-01-15), though a core gauge rose more than economists had anticipated. Still, Nymex oil prices appeared to pare some of their gains after the Federal Reserve’s [Beige Book assessment](http://www.marketwatch.com/story/fed-beige-book-shows-positive-outlook-2014-01-15) expressed a positive outlook about economic growth. The release came shortly before the Nymex oil close. [Nymex oil prices on Tuesday climbed](http://www.marketwatch.com/story/oil-rebounds-after-losses-on-iran-nuclear-news-2014-01-14) 0.9% as U.S. retail sales [showed an unexpected increase](http://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-retail-sales-rise-02-in-december-2014-01-14) in December and U.S. stocks [had their best day of the year so far.](http://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-stocks-rise-after-retail-sales-top-forecasts-2014-01-14) Global supply growth On ICE Futures Wednesday, February Brent crude tacked on 74 cents, or 0.7%, to close at $107.13 a barrel, ahead of the contract’s expiration on Thursday. Prices for the European benchmark had fallen 0.3% on Tuesday.

#### New energy tech leads to OPEC flooding the oil market – turns solvency and crushes prices

Energy Tech Stocks 8—quoting Dr. Marcel, Ph.D. in IR and Senior Research Fellow at the Chatham House (“Petro-politics Expert Marcel: Saudis Have Oil But Not Enough; OPEC May Flood Market To Hurt New Techs,” 27 January 2008, <http://energytechstocks.com.previewmysite.com/wp/?cat=15&paged=2>, AMiles)

Saudi Arabia still has a lot of oil; nevertheless, the world doesn’t have enough to meet forecasted demand of roughly 115 million barrels a day by 2030, a more than 30% increase over today’s 87 million barrel daily consumption. Shorter term, should OPEC members feel threatened by new alternative energy technologies, they very well may flood the market, temporarily driving crude prices down in order to make the new technologies appear financially unattractive. That’s the analysis of Valerie Marcel, a Dubai-based petro-politics expert and the author of “Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East.” During a lengthy conversation, Marcel, who is an associate fellow at UK-based Chatham House, one of Europe’s leading foreign policy think-tanks, told EnergyTechStocks.com that she wasn’t optimistic that oil shortages can be avoided, despite growing recognition of the problem in major oil-consuming nations. Marcel further said that the Saudi national oil company – Saudi Aramco – appears worried about fuel cell vehicles and other attempts by the world to wean itself off oil, and that should it and other OPEC members feel threatened, they would “play hardball,” flooding the market in an attempt to derail the new technologies. Marcel said that after 36 separate interviews with oil company officials, she believes Saudi Arabia probably has about 75 years of reserves remaining at current production rates, and that the Kingdom is capable of raising daily production from around nine million barrels a day currently to a sustained 12.5 million per day, which is its plan. At the same time, Marcel said she understands why, given the Kingdom’s self-imposed secrecy surrounding its oil industry, the world keeps asking, “Why should we trust them?”

#### That collapses Russia’s economy

Mohamedi 3 (Fareed , Chief economist at PFC Energy. “Add Added In the Wake of War: Geo–strategy, Terrorism, Oil and Domestic Politics,” Spring 2003, Middle East Policy, 10.1, Ebsco)

A more aggressive strategy - and actually a better strategy for the Saudis in many ways over the longer term and for OPEC - would be to crash oil prices and not agree to accommodate Iraq. To do what they did in '99 and inadvertently discovered had some advantages: push the burden onto non-OPEC producers - the high-cost producers - and over time induce a decline in non-OPEC production, and then come back and take that share of demand for themselves. That would require a fairly low oil price, $14-$15 a barrel. You may ask, how can the oil producers' economies take that? They can barely take it at $30 a barrel. If you look at the macroeconomic situation in some of the Gulf countries - Saudi Arabia and Iran, even Algeria - they have accumulated a lot of assets and paid down a lot of their debt. Financially, they're doing a lot better than they were just a few years ago. To a certain extent, they have the war chest to do this if they have the will and the guts. In sharp contrast, this would be disastrous for Indonesia, Russia, Venezuela and Nigeria. None of these countries can take that type of low oil price for a period of 18 months to two years.

#### That goes nuclear

Filger 9 – Sheldon Filger, columnist and founder of GlobalEconomicCrisis.com, May 10, 2009, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction,” online: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis\_b\_201147.html

The Medvedev/Putin regime has initiated a host of policy responses to mitigate the impact of the Global Economic Crisis on the nation's fragile economy. Time will determine their long-term effectiveness; however, in the short-term some measures have proven more efficacious than others. A major goal of Moscow's economic technocrats has been to stabilize the country's banking system, and for the time being a degree of success has been achieved through government provision of liquidity to financial institutions. However, this complex geopolitical space that is Russia is now facing a vast array of complex challenges that other members of the G8 are spared, despite the destructive impact of the global synchronized recession facing all major industrialized countries.

In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash.

Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world.

During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

### 3

#### TPA will pass—PC key

Parnes, 1/21 (Amie, 1/21/2014, “Obama: Give me fast track trade,” <http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/195858-white-house-works-to-convince-dems-to-give-obama-fast-track-on-trade>))

The White House is making a major push to convince Congress to give the president trade promotion authority (TPA), which would make it easier for President Obama to negotiate pacts with other countries.

A flurry of meetings has taken place in recent days since legislation was introduced to give the president the authority, with U.S. Trade Representative Mike Froman meeting with approximately 70 lawmakers on both sides of the aisle in the House and Senate.

White House chief of staff Denis McDonough has also been placing calls and meeting with top Democratic lawmakers in recent days to discuss trade and other issues.

Republicans have noticed a change in the administration’s interest in the issue, which is expected to be a part of Obama’s State of the Union address in one week.

While there was “a lack of engagement,” as one senior Republican aide put it, there is now a new energy from the White House since the bill dropped.

The effort to get Congress to grant Obama trade promotion authority comes as the White House seeks to complete trade deals with the European Union, and a group of Asian and Latin American countries as part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP.

The authority would put time limits on congressional consideration of those deals and prevent the deals from being amended by Congress. That would give the administration more leverage with trading partners in its negotiations.

The trade push dovetails with the administration’s efforts to raise the issue of income inequality ahead of the 2014 midterm elections. The White House is pressing Republicans to raise the minimum wage and extend federal unemployment benefits.

The difference is, on the minimum wage hike and unemployment issue, Obama has willing partners in congressional Democrats and unions, who are more skeptical of free trade. Republicans are more the willing partner on backing trade promotion authority.

Legislation introduced last week to give Obama trade promotion authority was sponsored by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp (R-Mich.) and Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-Mont.), as well as Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), the ranking member on Finance.

No House Democrats are co-sponsoring the bill, however, and Rep. Sandy Levin (D-Mich.), the Ways and Means Committee ranking member, and Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.), the panel’s former chairman, have both criticized it. They said the legislation doesn’t give enough leverage and power to Congress during trade negotiations.

Getting TPA passed would be a major victory for the administration, and one that would please business groups, but the White House will first have to convince Democrats to go along with it.

One senior administration official said the White House has been in dialogue with lawmakers on both sides of the aisle “with a real focus on Democrats” to explain TPA and take into account their concerns.

“Any trade matter presents challenges,” the senior administration official said, adding that White House officials are “devoted” to working with members on the issue.

The Democratic opposition makes it highly unlikely the trade promotion authority bill, in its current form at least, will go anywhere.

One big problem is that it was negotiated by Baucus, who is about to leave the Senate to become ambassador to China.

Baucus will be replaced by Sen. Ron Wyden (Ore.), who is said to disagree with the approach taken by his predecessor. Democratic aides predict the legislation, which Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) called “controversial” last week, would have to be completely redone to gain traction among lawmakers in their party.

Some Democrats might see a disconnect between the White House’s push for trade and it’s separate push on income inequality, which has been embraced by the party.

But that doesn’t mean the White House won’t ramp up their focus on trade in the coming weeks and months.

Senior congressional aides expect trade to be a part of Obama’s upcoming State of the Union address, since the White House has made clear that the trade bill is a priority and the TPP trade pact is a core part of the administration’s overall jobs agenda, in terms of increasing exports and opening markets.

“This is a priority of the president's,” White House press secretary Jay Carney told reporters last week. “It's part of a broad approach to expanding exports and, you know, creating more opportunities for our businesses to grow. And we're going to continue to push for it.”

In the same vein, House Republicans will continue to increase pressure on the administration to get Democrats on board.

“The White House carries the weight on this,” one senior House aide said.

#### Plan kills CIR—focus and PC Link

Shear, 13

(Michael, NYT White house correspondent, 5/5, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/americas/in-latin-america-us-shifts-focus-from-drug-war-to-economy.html?pagewanted=all>)

Last week, Mr. Obama returned to capitals in Latin America with a vastly different message. Relationships with countries racked by drug violence and organized crime should focus more on economic development and less on the endless battles against drug traffickers and organized crime capos that have left few clear victors. The countries, Mexico in particular, need to set their own course on security, with the United States playing more of a backing role. That approach runs the risk of being seen as kowtowing to governments more concerned about their public image than the underlying problems tarnishing it. Mexico, which is eager to play up its economic growth, has mounted an aggressive effort to play down its crime problems, going as far as to encourage the news media to avoid certain slang words in reports. “The problem will not just go away,” said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue. “It needs to be tackled head-on, with a comprehensive strategy that includes but goes beyond stimulating economic growth and alleviating poverty. “Obama becomes vulnerable to the charge of downplaying the region’s overriding issue, and the chief obstacle to economic progress,” he added. “It is fine to change the narrative from security to economics as long as the reality on the ground reflects and fits with the new story line.” Administration officials insist that Mr. Obama remains cleareyed about the security challenges, but the new emphasis corresponds with a change in focus by the Mexican government. The new Mexican president, Enrique Peña Nieto, took office in December vowing to reduce the violence that exploded under the militarized approach to the drug war adopted by his predecessor, Felipe Calderón. That effort left about 60,000 Mexicans dead and appears not to have significantly damaged the drug-trafficking industry. In addition to a focus on reducing violence, which some critics have interpreted as taking a softer line on the drug gangs, Mr. Peña Nieto has also moved to reduce American involvement in law enforcement south of the border. With friction and mistrust between American and Mexican law enforcement agencies growing, Mr. Obama suggested that the United States would no longer seek to dominate the security agenda. “It is obviously up to the Mexican people to determine their security structures and how it engages with other nations, including the United States,” he said, standing next to Mr. Peña Nieto on Thursday in Mexico City. “But the main point I made to the president is that we support the Mexican government’s focus on reducing violence, and we look forward to continuing our good cooperation in any way that the Mexican government deems appropriate.” In some ways, conceding leadership of the drug fight to Mexico hews to a guiding principle of Mr. Obama’s foreign policy, in which American supremacy is played down, at least publicly, in favor of a multilateral approach. But that philosophy could collide with the concerns of lawmakers in Washington, who have expressed frustration with what they see as a lack of clarity in Mexico’s security plans. And security analysts say the entrenched corruption in Mexican law enforcement has long clouded the partnership with their American counterparts. Putting Mexico in the driver’s seat on security marks a shift in a balance of power that has always tipped to the United States and, analysts said, will carry political risk as Congress negotiates an immigration bill that is expected to include provisions for tighter border security. “If there is a perception in the U.S. Congress that security cooperation is weakening, that could play into the hands of those who oppose immigration reform,” said Vanda Felbab-Brown, a counternarcotics expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “Realistically, the border is as tight as could be and there have been few spillovers of the violence from Mexico into the U.S.,” she added, but perceptions count in Washington “and can be easily distorted.” “Drugs today are not very important to the U.S. public over all,” she added, “but they are important to committed drug warriors who are politically powerful.” Representative Michael T. McCaul, a Texas Republican who is chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, has warned against the danger of drug cartels forming alliances with terrorist groups. “While these threats exist, you would be surprised to find that the administration thinks its work here is done,” he wrote in an opinion article for Roll Call last month, pressing for more border controls in the bill. The Obama administration has said any evidence of such cooperation is very thin, but even without terrorist connections, drug gangs pose threats to peace and security. Human rights advocates said they feared the United States would ease pressure on Mexico to investigate disappearances and other abuses at the hands of the police and military, who have received substantial American support. The shift in approach “suggests that the Obama administration either doesn’t object to these abusive practices or is only willing to raise such concerns when it’s politically convenient,” said José Miguel Vivanco, director of Human Rights Watch’s Americas division. Still, administration officials have said there may have been an overemphasis on the bellicose language and high-profile hunts for cartel leaders while the real problem of lawlessness worsens. American antidrug aid is shifting more toward training police and shoring up judicial systems that have allowed criminals to kill with impunity in Mexico and Central America. United States officials said Mr. Obama remains well aware of the region’s problems with security, even as he is determined that they not overshadow the economic opportunities. It is clear Mr. Obama, whatever his words four years ago, now believes there has been too much security talk. In a speech to Mexican students on Friday, Mr. Obama urged people in the two countries to look beyond a one-dimensional focus on what he called real security concerns, saying it is “time for us to put the old mind-sets aside.” And he repeated the theme later in the day in Costa Rica, lamenting that when it comes to the United States and Central America, “so much of the focus ends up being on security.” “We also have to recognize that problems like narco-trafficking arise in part when a country is vulnerable because of poverty, because of institutions that are not working for the people, because young people don’t see a brighter future ahead,” Mr. Obama said in a news conference with Laura Chinchilla, the president of Costa Rica.

#### Passing TPA is critical to the future viability of the WTO – which will collapse now.

Jeffrey Schott 6/14/13 Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics Payoff from the World Trade Agenda

Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC

June 14, 2013 http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/transcript-20130614.pdf

Now, what are the prospects for Bali? Well, they’re not so good. Trade ministers are prone to accentuate the positive. But when APEC trade leaders met in Surabaya, Indonesia in April of this year, they admitted, and I need to quote this. This is what they said: “The negotiation as it stands now is not on course to lead to a successful outcome at the Ministerial Conference 9 in Bali.” And then even more ominously they said: “The continued viability of the WTO’s negotiating function is at serious risk.” So that’s what our trade leaders, our optimistic trade leaders are saying about the prospects for moving forward later this year in Bali. And it underscores the task that Terry and others have. And it has to be more than the business community, but as Fred said it has to be certainly pushed hard by the business community to just get the officials and the negotiators to recognize that there’s a lot at stake and a big window of opportunity to make progress, but a big cost if they don’t. Now, what are the reasons for the impasse? And this is something that goes beyond what we put in our study. It’s more of a postscript to our study to look at the task going forward. And there are a number of problems that beset the preparations for the Bali Ministerial. You can call them Bali aches if you like. Oh, yeah, I was wondering whether to say that, and obviously I shouldn’t have. The first is issue with linkages. These are tactical gambits that risk blocking agreement like similar moves blocked agreement on the overall DOHA agenda over the past 10 years. And the key problem going forward for Bali is linking what is called food security subsidies with the trade facilitation agreement. There are important issues with regard to food security. There are important issues with regard to agricultural subsidies. But they should not be used in a way that blocks the ability to get the big deliverable out of Bali. And negotiators are still tied up in knots on how to do that. The second problem regards imbalances. Each country has a different idea of what is a balanced accord. Now, the terminology is important. In the past, we talked in trade negotiations about reciprocity. Reciprocity is an ambiguous term, but it’s a lot clearer than talking about balanced because each country hastheir own idea of what balanced is and there’s no consistent standard to set it on. So the first imbalance derives from differences in how countries value the benefit of policy change, basically taking what’s going on now and changing what countries do in order to open up more opportunities from trade and investment and how they value the increase in policy predictability that comes when new obligations constrain the ability of governments to reverse liberalization and to add new protectionism. So those are important. How do you value those things? In fact, the appreciation of the value of those two aspects is sometimes not well understood. The second imbalance comes between the level of progress that is needed on market access across agriculture and manufacturing and services, and the progress on commitments to new rule-making obligations, which often also encompass reforms that result in improved market access. This is part of the problem with the duty-free, quota-free issue and the resistance to going to a 100 percent coverage of tariff lines in a number of countries. There needs to be progress both on the coverage of the tariff preferences for the least developed countries. But there also needs to be progress on the eligibility rules for qualifying for the preferential rates. I mean, there are some countries that provide a 100 percent duty-free, quota-free treatment for least developed countries, but those countries don’t get access to that market because the eligibility rules, the content requirements and the like, basically block them from access to those markets. So those two things have to be done. There has to be a greater liberalization of the eligibility requirements to make those LDC preferences meaningful. And third, there are leadership lapses. And this has been throughout the DOHA Round, so this is nothing new. The big players, developed and developing, need to put their chips on the table. For the U.S. and the EU, this means real constraints on farm supports and real new access for the exports of the least developed countries. These countries should be more responsive with regards to cuts of agricultural export subsidies—that’s one of our initiatives in our study. And indeed, there has been suggestions for 16 Bali that developing countries want the U.S. and Europe to commit to a 50 percent down payment on reductions of agricultural export subsidies, but that’s actually doable given the current climate of high commodity prices and should be acceptable if the deal included a snapback clause. But it seems to be resisted so far. And this is one area where the negotiators are being a bit too risk-averse. For China, it means dropping the charade that they are recently a ceded member to the WTO, and therefore, don’t have to do anymore. They need to do more. They need to commit to broader liberalization than other developing countries. And they have the ability to do that. For all the BRICs, it means advancing services negotiations as a means to unblock the negotiating impasse on agriculture and on NAMA. Now, this audience probably is focusing on, well, how the heck is the United States going to do in any of this. And it leads to the question of what about trade promotion authority. For the U.S., passage of new trade promotion authority would send a very positive signal that we were willing and able to make these commitments and follow through on them, and it should be done soon. And I was pleased that Mike Froman in these confirmation hearings gave the committee assurances that he would work closely with the Finance and Ways and Means Committee that are already doing preparatory work on new legislation. Now, soon in this context given legislative realities means that a bill should be either passed or at least well advanced before Bali. I think if there’s a clear sign that the Congress is moving forward and will enact trade promotion authority that this will make it easier for the U.S. negotiators to put together the type of deal that serves our broad interest and those of the trading system. But, passage of the farm bill could send exactly the opposite signal, at least the way it is being considered right now and if key Senate provisions are enacted. It’s interesting that legislators hardly take into consideration at all international trade negotiations when they put together a farm bill. And while they should deal with the concerns of their constituents, their constituents are operating in global markets. And it’s interesting that while there’s interesting cutting subsidies in the Congress, the subsidies that they’re considering cutting are the only ones that are actually legal under the WTO system. So they’re cutting the legal subsidies and proposing new subsidies that would, if not be illegal, would be actionable and considered trade distorting under the WTO. So this is a problem and for Bali, if Congress doesn’t act on the farm bill, that may be a positive thing. So in sum, I think what has come out of our study is that there are a lot of important things that should and can be done. A Bali deal is critical to rebuilding confidence in WTO negotiations. And simply put, officials need to demonstrate that WTO talks can produce results. That used to be why everyone went to Geneva during the GATT era. But there has been a great deal of skepticism in recent years that negotiators recognized the urgency of getting something done. And second, Bali needs to produce a solid down payment on a bigger WTO package that would be pulled together and accelerated negotiations post Bali.

**Trade wars go nuclear**

**Miller and Elwood**, **98** (Vincent and James, Founder and Vice-President of the International Society for Individual Liberty, “Free Trade or Proectionism? The Case Against Trade Restrictions,” www.isil.org/resources/lit/free-trade-protectionism.html)

WHEN GOODS DON'T CROSS BORDERS, ARMIES OFTEN DO History is not lacking in examples of cold trade wars escalating into hot shooting wars: Europe suffered from almost non-stop wars during the 17th and 18th centuries, when restrictive trade policy (mercantilism) was the rule; rival governments fought each other to expand their empires and to exploit captive markets. British tariffs provoked the American colonists to revolution, and later the Northern-dominated US government imposed restrictions on Southern cotton exports - a major factor leading to the American Civil War. In the late 19th Century, after a half century of general free trade (which brought a half-century of peace), short-sighted politicians throughout Europe again began erecting trade barriers. Hostilities built up until they eventually exploded into World War I. In 1930, facing only a mild recession, US President Hoover ignored warning pleas in a petition by 1028 prominent economists and signed the notorious Smoot-Hawley Act, which raised some tariffs to 100% levels. Within a year, over 25 other governments had retaliated by passing similar laws. The result? World trade came to a grinding halt, and the entire world was plunged into the "Great Depression" for the rest of the decade. The depression in turn led to World War II. THE #1 DANGER TO WORLD PEACE The world enjoyed its greatest economic growth during the relatively free trade period of 1945-1970, a period that also saw no major wars. Yet we again see trade barriers being raised around the world by short-sighted politicians. Will the world again end up in a shooting war as a result of these economically-deranged policies? Can we afford to allow this to happen in the nuclear age? "What generates war is the economic philosophy of nationalism: embargoes, trade and foreign exchange controls, monetary devaluation, etc. The philosophy of protectionism is a philosophy of war."  
Ludwig von Mises

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#### Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase its renewable energy investment in the United States.

#### Competes – doesn’t engage with Mexico. The net benefits are the China DA, politics, and the blackouts case turn.

### Heg

#### Oil independence doesn’t solve foreign entanglement – global pricing makes military presence inevitable to insulate domestic markets from price shocks

ESLC 12—Energy Security Leadership Council

The New American Oil Boom: Implications for Energy Security pg 34

Rising oil production will not mitigate the foreign and military challenges of U.S. oil dependence: Whether the result of production disruptions due to conflict in a specific country or the impediment of supply through a critical shipping route, interruptions to the flow of oil can be highly economically damaging for the U.S. and global economies, as discussed above. To mitigate this risk, U.S. armed forces expend enormous resources protecting chronically vulnerable infrastructure in hostile corners of the globe and patrolling oil transit routes. This engagement benefits all nations, but comes primarily at the expense of the American military and ultimately the American taxpayer. A 2009 study by the RAND Corporation placed the ongoing cost of this burden at between $67.5 billion and $83 billion annually, plus an additional $8 billion in military operations.173 As U.S. oil imports continue to decline, and other countries—China in particular—grow to become larger net oil importers, many are asking whether the United States will be relieved of its oil-security duties. The question has gained a particular relevance as U.S. imports from the Middle East have declined substantially in recent years. Persian Gulf supplies to the United States were down to 1.8 mbd in 2011 after being as high as 2.8 mbd in 2001.174 Unfortunately, the United States will remain committed to stability in the Middle East—and a handful of other critical oil producing regions—for the foreseeable future. The growth of domestic oil supply in the United States between 2009 and 2011 is an impressive story. Nonetheless, the U.S. commitment to global oil security is largely a function of the importance of oil in the global and domestic economies, and the United States is expected to remain the world’s largest oil consumer for decades. The United States has clearly placed a special significance on the security of Persian Gulf oil supplies as far back as the Carter Administration, but this has very little to do with the direct importance of those supplies to the United States. In fact, since 1981, Persian Gulf supplies have never accounted for more than 15 percent of U.S. oil supplies.175 Instead, the American commitment to the Middle East is based on the importance of that region for the stability of the global market, for which Persian Gulf suppliers accounted for 30 percent of total oil supplies in 2011 and as much as 37 percent in 1974.176 The fact is that the world market—on which the U.S. economy depends—derives a significant quantity of its supplies from geopolitically risky countries in the Middle East and North Africa. More broadly, the number of threats to oil flows is as high today as it has ever been, and the consequences of a disruption for the U.S. economy are just as dire. Consider that, in 2010, total world oil production amounted to approximately 88 million barrels per day, and more than 50 percent was moved by tankers on fixed maritime routes.177 The majority of these supplies transited a strategic chokepoint such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Straits of Malacca, or the Suez Canal, all narrow waterways that present hostile actors with an opportunity to disrupt large volumes of oil and the global economy. Looking forward, it is difficult to imagine a reduced U.S. commitment to the Middle East. The International Energy Agency recently estimated that the Persian Gulf will supply 32 percent of the world’s oil in 2020 and 35 percent in 2030.178 As long as oil is priced in a global market, and oil plays a critical role in the U.S. economy, no amount of domestic production will eliminate the U.S. commitment to the security of this region or any other region critical to global oil flows.

#### No impact to heg – empirics

Fettweis 10 – Professor of national security affairs at U.S. Naval War College (Christopher J., “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Informaworld, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82)

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilizing power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

**No energy wars**

**Fettweis ‘10 – Professor of Political Science @ Tulane**

Christopher, Professor of Political Science @ Tulane, Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace, pg. 126

If the cases above are any indication, no stage of this life cycle carries much risk of major war to control resources. In fact, the most obvious observation that emerges from the study of petropolitics is that at no time have great powers come close to loggerheads over control of these vital regions. No country has ever actively prepared to conquer these weak areas, nor has any felt it necessary to prepare to defend them. Consumer cooperation, rather than conflict, is **the rule**. There has never been a war to control territory that contains fossil fuels, and there are good reasons to believe it is likely that there never will be. The conventional wisdom concerning the inevitability of energy wars is probably **wrong**. Why has great power behavior failed to live up to pessimistic expectations? While it is hard to argue that democracy has helped confound the various ecopessimist projections, since not all interested parties are democracies, other rationalist explanations for stability cannot be entirely ruled out. Perhaps it is the fear of escalation toward a nuclear holocaust that has kept the great powers from fighting over oil. Perhaps liberal internationalists are correct and complex interdependence should be given primary credit. 'Whatever the initial cause the idea that war would be a viable option to control the most valuable regions in the world does not seem to have occurred to the great consumer nations. As time goes on, it becomes **more** and more **unlikely** that it ever will. Resources have historically been a primary motivator for war. The most valuable regions-those worthy of contestation and conquest-have always been those that were the richest. Today, **that calculation seems to have changed**, even regarding the most vulnerable, valuable regions in the world. It seems as if the states of the industrialized world have indeed taken Angell's ideas to heart and have reached the conclusion that oil is not worth fighting one another for. Perhaps, for the first time, nothing is.

#### Their internal link can’t affect the structural factors their impact ev points to

Maher 11—adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci, Brown (Richard, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1, Amiles)

The United States should start planning now for the inevitable decline of its preeminent position in world politics. By taking steps now, the United States will be able to position itself to exercise maximum influence beyond its era of preponderance. This will be America’s fourth attempt at world order. The first, following World War I and the creation of the League of Nations, was a disaster. The second and third, coming in 1945 and 1989-1991, respectively, should be considered significant achievements of U.S. foreign policy and of creating world order. This fourth attempt at world order will go a long way in determining the basic shape and character of world politics and international history for the twenty-first century. The most fundamental necessity for the United States is to create a stable political order that is likely to endure, and that provides for stable relations among the great powers. The United States and other global stakeholders must prevent a return to the 1930s, an era defined by open trade conflict, power competition, and intense nationalism. Fortunately, the United States is in a good position to do this. The global political order that now exists is largely of American creation. Moreover, its forward presence in Europe and East Asia will likely persist for decades to come, ensuring that the United States will remain a major player in these regions. The disparity in military power between the United States and the rest of the world is profound, and this gap will not close in the next several decades at least. In creating a new global political order for twenty-first century world politics, the United States will have to rely on both the realist and liberal traditions of American foreign policy, which will include deterrence and power balancing, but also using international institutions to shape other countries’ preferences and interests. Adapt International Institutions for a New Era of World Politics. The United States should seek to ensure that the global rules, institutions, and norms that it took the lead in creating—which reflect basic American preferences and interests, thus constituting an important element of American power—outlive American preeminence. We know that institutions acquire a certain ‘‘stickiness’’ that allow them to exist long after the features or forces at the time of their creation give way to a new landscape of global politics. The transaction costs of creating a whole new international—or even regional— institutional architecture that would compete with the American post-World War II vintage would be enormous. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO), all reflect basic American preferences for an open trading system and, with a few exceptions, have near-universal membership and overwhelming legitimacy. Even states with which the United States has significant political, economic, or diplomatic disagreement—China, Russia, and Iran—have strongly desired membership in these ‘‘Made in USA’’ institutions. Shifts in the global balance of power will be reflected in these institutions—such as the decision at the September 2009 Pittsburgh G-20 summit to increase China’s voting weight in the IMF by five percentage points, largely at the expense of European countries such as Britain and France. Yet these institutions, if their evolution is managed with deftness and skill, will disproportionately benefit the United States long after the demise of its unparalleled position in world politics. In this sense, the United States will be able to ‘‘lock in’’ a durable international order that will continue to reflect its own basic interests and values. Importantly, the United States should seek to use its vast power in the broad interest of the world, not simply for its own narrow or parochial interests. During the second half of the twentieth century the United States pursued its own interests but also served the interests of the world more broadly. And there was intense global demand for the collective goods and services the United States provided. The United States, along with Great Britain, are history’s only two examples of liberal empires. Rather than an act of altruism, this will improve America’s strategic position. States and societies that are prosperous and stable are less likely to display aggressive or antagonistic behavior in their foreign policies. There are things the United States can do that would hasten the end of American preeminence, and acting in a seemingly arbitrary, capricious, and unilateral manner is one of them. The more the rest of the world views the American-made world as legitimate, and as serving their own interests, the less likely they will be to seek to challenge or even transform it.19 Cultivate Balance of Power Relationships in Other Regions. The United States enjoys better relations with most states than these states do with their regional neighbors. South and East Asia are regions in which distrust, resentment, and outright hostility abound. The United States enjoys relatively strong (if far from perfect) strategic relationships with most of the major states in Asia, including Japan, India, Pakistan, and South Korea. The United States and China have their differences, and a more intense strategic rivalry could develop between the two. However, right now the relationship is generally stable. With the possible exception of China (but perhaps even Beijing views the American military presence in East Asia as an assurance against Japanese revanchism), these countries prefer a U.S. presence in Asia, and in fact view good relations with the United States as indispensable for their own security.

**Oil dependence leads to global peace – prevents Iranian proliferation and conflict with Russia**

Howard ‘8 (Roger, writer and broadcaster specializing in international relations, published author, “An Ode to Oil”, Nov 29, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122791647562165587.html>, CMR)

Alarming as these scenarios are, they disguise the true picture, one that is really much more complicated and much more reassuring. While there are, of course, circumstances in which oil can exacerbate tensions and be a source of conflict, it can also act as a peacemaker and source of stability. So to identify America's "foreign oil dependency" as a source of vulnerability and weakness is just too neat and easy.¶ This identification wholly ignores the dependency of foreign oil producers on their consumers, above all on the world's largest single market -- the United States. Despite efforts to diversify their economies, all of the world's key exporters are highly dependent on oil's proceeds and have always lived in fear of the moment that has now become real -- when global demand slackens and prices fall. The recent, dramatic fall in price per barrel -- now standing at around $54, less than four months after peaking at $147 -- perfectly exemplifies the producers' predicament.¶ So even if such a move were possible in today's global market, no oil exporter is ever in a position to alienate its customers. Supposed threats of embargoes ring hollow because no producer can assume that its own economy will be damaged any less than that of any importing country. What's more, a supply disruption would always seriously damp global demand. Even in the best of times, a prolonged price spike could easily tip the world into economic recession, prompt consumers to shake off their gasoline dependency, or accelerate a scientific drive to find alternative fuels. Fearful of this "demand destruction" when crude prices soared so spectacularly in the summer, the Saudis pledged to pump their wells at full tilt. It seems that their worst fears were realized: Americans drove 9.6 billion fewer miles in July this year compared with last, according to the Department of Transportation.¶ Instead, the dependency of foreign oil producers on their customers plays straight into America's strategic hands. Washington is conceivably in a position to hold producers to ransom by threatening to accelerate a drive to develop or implement alternative fuels, realizing the warning once uttered by Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the former Saudi oil minister who pointed out that "the Stone Age did not end for lack of stone." Back in 1973, as they protested at Washington's stance on the Arab-Israeli dispute, Middle East producers were in a position to impose an oil embargo on the Western world. But a generation later, technological advances, and the strength of public and scientific concern about global warming, have turned the tables.¶ The United States has powerful political leverage over producers because it holds the key to future oil supply as well as market demand. The age of "easy oil" is over, and as fears grow that oil is becoming harder to get, so too will the dependency of producers on increasingly sophisticated Western technology and expertise.¶ Such skills will be particularly important in two key areas of oil production. One is finding and extracting offshore deposits, like the massive reserves reckoned to be under the Caspian and Arctic seas, or in Brazil's recently discovered Tupi field. The other is prolonging the lifespan of declining wells through enhanced "tertiary" recovery. Because Western companies have a clear technological edge over their global competitors in these hugely demanding areas, Washington exerts some powerful political leverage over exporters, many of whom openly anticipate the moment when their production peaks before gradually starting to decline.¶ Syria illustrates how this leverage can work. Although oil has been the primary source of national income for more than 40 years, production has recently waned dramatically: Output is now nearly half of the peak it reached in the mid-1990s, when a daily output of 600,000 barrels made up 60% of gross domestic product, and can barely sustain rapidly growing domestic demand fueled by a very high rate of population growth. With enough foreign investment Syrian oil could be much more productive and enduring, but Washington has sent foreign companies, as well as American firms, a tough message to steer well clear. It is not surprising, then, that the Damascus regime regards a rapprochement with the U.S. as a political lifeline and in recent months has shown signs of a new willingness to compromise.¶ The same predicament confronted Libya's Col. Moammar Gadhafi, who first offered to surrender weapons of mass destruction during secret negotiations with U.S. officials in May 1999. Facing a deepening economic crisis that he could not resolve without increasing the production of his main export, oil, Col. Gadhafi was prepared to bow to Washington's demands and eventually struck a path-breaking accord in December 2003. Col. Gadhafi had been the "Mad Dog" of the Reagan years, but oil's influence had initiated what President Bush hailed as "the process of rejoining the community of nations."¶ Oil could also help the outside world frustrate the nuclear ambitions of Iran, whose output is likely to steadily decline over the coming years unless it has access to the latest Western technology. Many wells are aging rapidly and the Iranians cannot improve recovery rates, or exploit their new discoveries, unless Washington lifts sanctions, which have been highly successful in deterring international investment.¶ Sometimes the markets will prove at least as effective as any American sanctions in keeping a tight political rein on oil producers. For example, when Russian forces attacked South Ossetia and Georgia on Aug. 8, Russia's stock market -- of which energy stocks comprise 60% -- plunged by nearly 7%, and within a week capital outflow reached a massive $16 billion, suddenly squeezing domestic credit while the ruble collapsed in value. A month later, the country was facing its worst crisis since the default of August 1998. But the future of the oil sector is so dependent on attracting massive foreign investment, and the wider Russian economy so heavily dependent on petrodollars, that the Kremlin simply can't afford to unnecessarily unnerve investors.¶ Today the markets know that Russia needs at least $1 trillion in investment if it is to maintain, let alone increase, its oil production. Just five years ago, output was increasing so fast -- energy giants Yukos and Sibneft were posting annual production gains of 20% -- that even the Saudis were worried about their own global dominance. But in the past year Russian oil production has started to wane. Leonid Fedun, a top official at Lukoil, Russia's No. 2 oil producer, admitted back in April that national output had peaked and was unlikely to return to 2007 levels "in my lifetime" and that "the period of intense oil production [growth] is over." Without foreign money and expertise to extract offshore oil and prolong the lifespan of existing wells, Russian production will fall dramatically.¶ Russia's oil, in other words, acted as peacemaker. This seems paradoxical for it has sometimes been said that the Kremlin's attack on South Ossetia and Georgia was prompted by an ambition to seize control of local pipelines. But although this was an aggravating factor, it was not the primary cause because Russian leaders would have felt threatened -- reasonably or not -- by the presence of NATO in what they regard as their own backyard even if the region was not an energy hub. They were also reportedly eyeing Ukraine, which has no petroleum deposits of its own and poses no threat to the dominance of their giant energy company, Gazprom.¶ Oil can also act as a peacemaker and source of stability because many conflicts, in almost every part of the world, can threaten a disruption of supply and instantly send crude prices spiraling. Despite the recent price falls, the market is still vulnerable to sudden supply shocks, and a sharp increase would massively affect the wider global economy. This would have potentially disastrous social and political results, just as in the summer many countries, including France, Nepal and Indonesia, were rocked by violent protests at dramatic price increases in gasoline.¶ Haunted by the specter of higher oil prices at a time of such economic fragility, many governments have a very strong incentive to use diplomacy, not force, to resolve their own disputes, and to help heal other people's. This is true not just of oil consumers but producers, which would also be keen not to watch global demand stifled by such price spikes.¶ Consider the events of last fall, when the Ankara government was set to retaliate against the Iraq-based Kurdish guerrillas who had killed 17 Turkish soldiers and taken others prisoner in a cross-border raid on Oct. 21, 2007. Even the mere prospect of such an attack sent the price of a barrel surging to a then record high of $85 because the markets knew that the insurgents could respond by damaging a key pipeline which moves 750,000 barrels of oil across Turkish territory every day.¶ Not surprisingly, the Bush administration pushed very hard to prevent a Turkish invasion of northern Iraq -- State Department spokesman Sean McCormack aptly described the frenzy of diplomatic activity as a "full-court press" -- not just to avoid shattering the vestiges of Iraq's political structure but also to stabilize oil prices. In the end it was American pressure that averted a major incursion, allowing crude prices to quickly ease. And the Turks would also have been aware that any invasion could have prompted retaliatory damage on the oil pipeline, losing them vast transit fees.¶ In general, oil is such a vital commodity, for consumers, producers and intermediaries alike, that it represents a meeting point for all manner of different interests. Sometimes it offers an opportunity for competitors and rivals to resolve differences, as in March 1995, when Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani tried to break deadlock with Washington by offering a technically very demanding oil contract to Conoco. Today, the symbiotic energy requirements of Europe and Russia allows scope to improve mutual relations, not least if European governments act in unison to impose the rules of the European Union's energy charter on Moscow. Oil also gives consumers a chance to penalize, or tempt, international miscreants, just as U.S. sanctions are forcing the Tehran regime to reassess its cost-benefit analysis of building the bomb.¶ What cannot go unchallenged is a facile equation between oil on the one hand, and war, bloodshed and, in America's particular case, strategic vulnerability on the other. For oil, fortunately, can often be our guardian.

#### Rapid renewables development overstretches spare capacity – internal link turns blackouts

The Economist 11 (“Difference Engine: Disaster waiting to happen,” Babbage, 9/16/11, http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/09/reliability-grid)//SJF

Yet, further down the coast, 6m citizens of southern California and south-west Arizona, along with their cousins across the Mexican border, were just recovering from a man-made disaster that had plunged their sweltering world into darkness—shutting down schools, hospitals, offices, factories, shops and restaurants, as lighting, air-conditioning and other essential equipment ceased to function. Beaches in San Diego had to be closed to the public because raw sewage had seeped into the sea. Passengers on trains stuck between stations and trapped in lifts had to be rescued by the police. Flights from San Diego International Airport were cancelled because security checkpoints were inoperable during the power outage and passenger processing could not be carried out. (Emergency runway lights meant that inbound flights could still land.) With traffic lights out of action and petrol stations unable to pump, motorists abandoned their vehicles and added to the gridlock that ruled the roads. By great good fortune, no-one died or was seriously injured. But normal life, for those so affected, ground to a miserable and unnerving halt. The difference between the two events could not have been more stark. One was all about preparedness and professionalism. The other was a forceful reminder of the chaos wrought by personal negligence and institutional neglect. “We don't need no lousy terrorists to cause mayhem,” San Diegans must have reflected afterwards. “We can manage just fine by ourselves.” The power outage that swept across a large swathe of the American south-west on September 8th was the region's worst cascading blackout in 15 years. It started at the North Gila substation near Yuma, Arizona, where a utility employee “was doing some work” on faulty equipment. Something happened (still under investigation) to cause the substation to shut down, disconnecting a 500kV transmission line connected to it and disrupting the electricity supply to Yuma's 90,000 residents. The immediate power shortage at Yuma caused the current—which normally flows along the grid's key Southwest Power Link from Arizona to California—suddenly to reverse its direction. The result was a violent fluctuation in line voltage that fed back through the grid to trip switches at substations throughout the San Diego area. Altogether, some 15 power stations in the region shut down automatically to protect themselves from voltage swings—the biggest being the 2,200MW San Onofre nuclear power plant up the coast near San Clemente. With the San Onofre plant disconnected and the umbilical cord from Arizona effectively severed, the delicately balanced grid serving San Diego and its adjacent counties quickly became unstable. Such problems would normally be resolved by ratcheting up the output of surrounding power stations. But with so little base-load capacity in the area, standby plants for meeting peak demand could not be spun up fast enough to stabilise the voltage. The overloaded grid promptly crashed, causing blackouts to spread across the region and into Mexico. The lights did not come back on until the following morning. The wind was blowing at only 8mph and the sky was partially overcast. So, California's lauded sources of renewable energy were of little help. If anything, they were part of the problem. Critics point out, with some justification, that California's energy strategy of focusing on conservation and expanding intermittent sources of renewable energy—while ignoring the urgent need for more base-load generating capacity close to big cities—was the primary cause of the grid failure. The wider issue is that the original voltage spike which triggered the monster outage should have been isolated at the Yuma substation in Arizona. The two official bodies responsible for overseeing the distribution and reliability of bulk power in the United States—the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)—have launched an inquiry to learn why that did not happen. Their report will no doubt apportion blame and recommend changes in maintenance procedures. But few expect it to address the underlying problem. Both FERC and NERC are only too aware of the structural reasons why the American grid has become so fragile. They are equally aware of how intractable to solution those reasons are. As elsewhere, the electrical-power industry in America has changed over recent decades from a collection of heavily regulated regional monopolies to a complex, competitive, national, free-market business. In the process, electricity has become a commodity, with futures and contracts traded by participants just like any other commodity business. Independent power providers and transmission companies construct their own facilities, often paid for with bonds backed by future revenue streams. Retailers sign up customers, buy the electricity from wholesalers around the country, and bill users for it. Managing supply and demand, once the prerogative of the utilities' planners, has become a process shaped largely by an energy company's appetite for risk. Meanwhile, independent system operators who schedule the dispatches of electricity have become, effectively, asset managers—using market-clearing prices to equilibrate between bids by suppliers and those from retailers. By and large, such changes have made energy markets more efficient. For consumers, the competition created by deregulation has kept a lid on electricity prices. But it has had downsides, too. One of the biggest is the way it has removed what little spare capacity the grid once had. In the power industry's new competitive environment, transmission companies operate their lines at near full capacity, leaving little room for those threatening fluctuations in voltage caused by accidental outages. Compounding matters further is the way long-distance transmission lines connecting utilities around the country are being used differently these days. Before deregulation, such links were employed largely for emergencies—for when, say, a utility found its voltage dipping precipitously and a brownout imminent. Today, long-haul power lines are frequently made to handle more power than they were designed to, as wholesalers sell their electricity over longer and longer distances. The juice that comes out of a plug in clean-energy California can easily have come from a dirty coal-fired plant in Wyoming or West Virginia. As a result, the grid now suffers far greater fluctuations in electricity flow than ever before. The continual cycling of power plants up and down to meet demand from elsewhere in the country causes generating and transmission parts to heat up and cool down repeatedly. No surprise that they then wear out faster. Meanwhile, the amount of money the American power industry spends on maintenance has declined steadily, by 1% a year since 1992. With the grid's most critical components—the transformers at substations—now typically 40 years old, there are serious consequences for the stability and reliability of the grid as a whole. Another downside of deregulation has been the decline in investment. As the independent power providers, the electricity retailers and the utilities have no responsibility for the grid's main links, they have little incentive to maintain them properly. And as long as it is possible to purchase electricity elsewhere, there is little further incentive—as in the case of San Diego—to add more capacity locally. More and more blackouts sweeping the country are therefore inevitable. Will the so-called “smart grid” improve matters? It could do the opposite. All the smart grid does is add a communications layer to the local electricity-distribution network—so consumers can see at a glance how much electricity they are using at any time of the day, and how much it is costing them. Alerts sent by the utility at peak periods will allow customers to cut back their consumption and save money—or have it cut back for them to reap extra rewards. The real aim, of course, is to save the utility from having to invest in additional capacity. What is rarely mentioned in all the proselytising about the smart grid is that it adds a vast layer of hackable points to the network—some 440m by 2015, according to Lockheed Martin's Energy and Cyber Services. Every smart meter in the home will be a hackable device. The same goes for all the routers at substations. As the saying goes, if you can communicate with it, you can hack it. Today, you can cut off the power to someone's home by shinning up the nearest electricity pole and throwing a switch at the top. Once smart meters become widespread, you will be able to do that remotely, from the far side of the world. But evil-doers from afar might not stop at that. Instead of switching off the power, they could run the voltage up and down to wreck sensitive electronic equipment, such as computers and television sets. And they could do that not just on single homes, but on whole communities and even to routers in substations—in an attempt to take transformers offline, if not actually fry them. As we saw last week, the failure of just one substation in Yuma was enough to bring a whole chunk of the American south-west to its knees. Unless the grid is made more robust and secure, the threat to the country—from terrorist or technician—can only become more severe.

Grid infrastructure failure, not energy supply, is the main cause of blackouts

Dade 12 (Corey, 7/7/12, “Gridlock: Storms, Blackouts Expose Power Problems” NPR) http://www.npr.org/2012/07/07/156402499/gridlock-storms-blackouts-expose-power-problems

As hundreds of thousands swelter without power a week after a violent storm pummeled the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic, energy experts say the future will look even worse if the nation's aging, congested electrical grid isn't upgraded. Customers chafe at rising utility bills, but the energy industry warns that the alternative is even scarier: Unless $673 billion is invested in the system, it could break down by 2020, according to an American Society of Civil Engineers report released in April. The grid's dependability has become an increasing concern as the system strains to meet increased demand. Bottlenecks in the grid and equipment failures are causing more brownouts and blackouts, energy experts say.

Nuclear power is worse for the grid

Madsen et al 09 (Travis Madsen and Tony Dutzik, analysts for Frontier Group, Bernadette Del Chiaro and Rob Sargent Environment America Research & Policy Center, November 2009, “GENERATING FAILURE How Building Nuclear Power Plants Would Set America Back in the Race Against Global Warming” Frontier Group, Environment America) http://www.frontiergroup.org/sites/default/files/reports/Generating-Failure---Environment-America---Web.pdf

Nuclear reactors produce electricity in huge, allor-nothing blocks of power, and are incapable of reacting nimbly to changes in electricity demand. From a reliability viewpoint, this aspect of nuclear power is actually a disadvantage. In fact, when power is supplied in huge blocks by large central station power plants, the failure of any individual power plant or power line carries a great risk of widespread electricity supply disruption. Existing nuclear power plants, particularly in recent years, have had a decent record of reliability. But when a nuclear reactor does shut down – even if such an event happens relatively infrequently – it can wreak havoc on the electric grid. For example, when two reactors at Turkey Point in southern Florida shut down in February 2008 because of a power line failure, the resulting power outage cut off electricity to more than 3 million customers in the Miami area for up to five hours – causing traffic jams, stranding people in elevators, and widely disrupting business. 194 Nuclear plants have a history of unanticipated failures, which sometimes lead to sustained outages. Of all 132 nuclear reactors ever built in the United States, 28 shut down prematurely because of cost or reliability problems, or in the case of Three Mile Island Unit 2, a near-meltdown. 195 Problems at another 35 reactors resulted in one or more outages of at least one year. 196 In addition, it can take days or weeks for a nuclear reactor to return to full output after an emergency shutdown. For example, nine nuclear reactors shut down automatically during the wide-ranging Northeast electric blackout that occurred on August 14, 2003. Nearly two weeks elapsed before these reactors regained full generation capacity. 197 (See Figure 10.) Prolonged deactivation of nuclear reactors in Canada threatened to cause another blackout in the days after the event. Government officials asked Ontario citizens to cut their electricity consumption in half to keep the system online. 198 A large amount of backup generation capacity had to be mobilized at high prices to restore electric service in the absence of the nuclear reactors. An electricity system made up of millions of small clean energy measures would yield a more flexible, more reliable electricity system compared to a new generation of nuclear power plants. In contrast to a single large power generating station, it is unlikely that all of the pieces of a diverse portfolio of clean energy resources will fail at the same time. The transient removal of any single small, clean generation unit or even group of units has little to no effect on the overall system. This will be especially true in a “smart grid,” where the electricity system operator will have the ability to manage electricity demand at the same time as supply. Moreover, distributed clean energy technologies – such as energy efficiency, rooftop solar panels and combined heat and power systems – are located near where the energy will be used, reducing the need for power to travel over transmission lines. These resources insulate individual customers from wider electricity disruptions. And since nearly all power failures originate in the transmission system, energy resources that bypass power lines can reduce the opportunity for grid failures in the first place. 200

Power grid is resilient

Ghosh 9, Bobby Ghosh, journalist and TIME Magazine's World Editor, 4/15/09 “How Vulnerable Is the Power Grid?” http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1891562,00.html

The most critical power users — the military, hospitals, the banking system, phone networks, Google's server farms — have multiple contingencies for uninterrupted power supply and backup generation. In the event of a cyberattack on the grid, they would be able to operate for long periods — days, weeks and, in some cases, indefinitely — without much difficulty. •The power grid is far from perfect. On any given day, 500,000 Americans experience an outage, says Arshad Mansoor of the Electric Power Research Institute, which is funded by the utility industry. Why is this a good thing? Because it means the grid deals with breakdowns all the time, and the industry knows how to fix them. The grid has built-in redundancies and manual overrides that allow for restoration of supply. Mansoor is careful to point out that these are "not defenses against cyberattacks, but for dealing with the consequence of such attacks." •The larger point is that in most cases, damage done to the power supply can be undone. "In the banking system, if someone hacks the system and steals information about 500,000 credit cards, it's incredibly tough to undo that damage," says Mansoor. "But if a section of the power grid goes down, we start it up again."

Obama’s stimulus solves—it updates the grid

Grunwald 12 (Michael, TIME's senior national correspondent, 7/3/12, “Obama Used His Power So That Future Storms Won’t Knock Out Your Power”

The Beltway isalways obsessed with power, but these days it’s particularlyobsessed with power**—**not the power that gets wielded and exercised, but the powerthat gets generatedand distributed**,** because it’s currently in short supply in Washingtonafter a nasty storm. Suddenly, commentators on the right as well as the left are sounding alarms about the pitiful state of America’s electric grid**.** They’re right, of course**.** But they haven’t mentioned a certain piece of federal legislation**—**if you’ve read anything I’ve written in recent years, then you probably know what I’m talking about—that made unprecedented investments in upgrading the grid. Yes, I’m once again talking about the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of February 2009, President Obama’s $787 billion stimulus bill. (If you share this obsession of mine, you should maybe get psychiatric help, and you should definitely pre-order my upcoming book.) The stimulus poured over $11 billion into grid improvements, including $4.5 billion for digital meters and other “smart grid” investments that will help improve the reliability of our century-old electric network. The stimulus grants have already financed over 10 million smart meters; Pepco, the utility villain of the recent “derecho,” received $34 million to help install them in every Washington home.

No impact to econ

Miller 2k – Professor of Management, Ottawa (Morris, Poverty As A Cause Of Wars?, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/pac256/WG4draft1.htm, AG)

Thus, these armed conflicts can hardly be said to be caused by poverty as a principal factor when the greed and envy of leaders and their hegemonic ambitions provide sufficient cause. The poor would appear to be more the victims than the perpetrators of armed conflict. It might be alleged that some dramatic event or rapid sequence of those types of events that lead to the exacerbation of poverty might be the catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who might be tempted to seek a diversion by finding/fabricating an enemy and going to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. **After** studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countriesin Latin America and Asia in the years since World War II **they** concluded **that** Much of **the conventional** wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong... The severity of economic crisis - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes. A more direct role was played by political variables such as ideological polarization, labor radicalism, guerilla insurgencies and an anti-Communist military... (**In democratic states) such** changes seldom lead toan outbreak of violence **(while**) in the cases of **dictatorships** and semi-democracies, the ruling elites **responded** to crises **by** increasing repression (thereby **using one form of violence to abort another.**

Resilient

Globe and Mail 2010 (5/31/10, BRIAN MILNER, "While gloom says bear, TIGER points to bull", lexis, WEA)

Even at the height of the remarkable rebound of 2009 that brought stocks back from the dead zone, the bears never retreated to their lairs. Negative sentiment among investors remained stubbornly high, no matter how promising the economic indicators looked. And then along came the Greeks and their little sovereign debt problem, the Chinese and their public hand-wringing over asset bubbles and the North Koreans and their latest idiotic sabre-ratting to remind nervous markets just how fragile the nascent global recovery could turn out to be. The latest survey of American investors last week showed bearish sentiment hovering close to 30 per cent, with plenty of room for an uptick in the months ahead, as the optimists come to realize that a V-shaped recovery was never in the cards after the worst global financial and economic crisis since the Great Depression. The world's most overexposed permabear, Nouriel Roubini, is still grabbing headlines with his dire Greece-is-just-the-tip-of-the-iceberg warnings. (Well, he does have a new book to sell.) And such high-profile Canadian bruins as gold-loving money manager Eric Sprott and eminent strategist and data miner David Rosenberg have never veered from their sombre outlooks. The fact that May turned into a particularly brutal month for just about everything but U.S. Treasuries - even after last week's modest rebound, the Dow posted its worst performance for the month in 70 years - only added fuel to arguments that worse, much worse, is yet to come. I mention all this to Eswar Prasad, when I reach the Cornell University economics professor at his hotel in Beijing. Prof. Prasad is a noted China watcher who once headed the IMF's China division and still keeps in close touch with top government finance officials. But on this call, I'm more interested in one of his other hats as a shrewd analyst of global economic and market trends. "My inclination also is to be a bear," the affable academic says. "But the data don't support my bearishness as much as I would like. One has to be a little cautious, because these are based on a variety of indicators. Some of them certainly show more strength than I had realized." The data he's talking about come out of his work on a new composite index derived from a broad set of economic, market and confidence measures in the G20 countries and designed to provide a quarterly snapshot of the global recovery. "All signs are that the recovery has some momentum," says Prof. Prasad, who developed the index at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank where he is also a senior fellow. "But I wouldn't call it solid enough momentum that we can consider it 'in the bag.'" The new index, cutely named TIGER (Tracking Indices for the Global Economic Recovery), is a joint effort by Brookings and the Financial Times. And TIGER shows that since the world began climbing out of the deep trough about the middle of last year, big emerging economies have roared ahead, while the developed world has experienced much more uneven results. Industrial production and trade have bounced back handsomely - total exports from the big emerging countries now exceed pre-crisis levels - but the employment picture remains cloudy and consumption has yet to develop a new head of steam. "It's much easier at this stage to list all the things that could derail the recovery," Prof. Prasad says. "But all of those things are still conjectural. The reality, and the data, is that things are looking better."

**Threat exaggeration**

**Maher 11—**PhD candidate in Political Science @ Brown

Richard, Ph.D. candidate in the Political Science department at Brown University, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States Will Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, 11/12/2011 Orbis, ScienceDirect

At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed, because of America’s unique political ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals as universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process, the United States is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For decades, perhaps since its very founding, the United States has viewed what is good for itself as good for the world. During its period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to maintain its position at the top and to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining elements of realpolitik and liberal universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic human rights). At times, these desires have conflicted with each other but they also capture the enduring tensions of America’s role in the world. The absence of constraints and America’s overestimation of its own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall position. And because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive domain of the president—who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the state’s enduring national interests—the policymaking process is open to special interests and outside influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Five features in particular, each a consequence of how America has used its power in the unipolar era, have worked to diminish America’s long-term material and strategic position. Overextension. During its period of preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values. Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define its interests in increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image.14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers’ control. Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their preeminence in the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological benefits. Preeminent states may, therefore, **overestimate** the intensity and immediacy of **threats**, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of threat to live with.

**Over-stretch and free riding**

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To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one’s role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States—in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia’s doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken ‘‘nation building’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is **beyond the pale** even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating—one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law—has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe—such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008— the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good—a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries—in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia—continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The **only way** to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically **decreases its share**. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States—maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used. Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest.

**Anti-Americanism**

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As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise toanti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one’s own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace itwith a governmentmuchmore friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itselfwhen—and under what conditions—military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of theworld had a particular animus for GeorgeW. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a ‘‘war’’ on terrorism and the division of theworld between goodand evil.Withpopulations around theworld mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen—let alone barely contemplated—such feelings of anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation. Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that America’s unprecedented power decreases its allies’ dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America’s allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy.

**Multipolarity solves**

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A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could change that, making these allies more dependent on the United States for their security. Russia’s reemergence could unnerve America’s European allies, just as China’s continued ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades. New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create incentives for America’s allies to reduce the disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce their security relationships with the United States.

# 2NC

### 2NC Overview

#### The introduction of competitive alternatives to oil forces Saudi Arabia to flood the makrket with cheap crude to depress prices and raise sales. Low prices undermine Russia’s oil-based economy and cause rapid instability which encourages Putin to pursue authoritarianism and adventurism.

#### Those go nuclear via regional draw-in and loose weapons because conomic instability reduces the security of their nuclear stockpiles – that outweighs:

#### Prefer magnitude

Bostrom 2 (Nick, Ph.D. in Philosophy – Oxford University and Winner – 2009 Eugene R. Gannon Award for the Continued Pursuit of Human Advancement, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, 9, March, <http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html>)

The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[2] At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[3] A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

#### And it turns the case:

Russian instability and adventurism cause counterbalancing and regional alliances and create a bipolar world reministcent of the iron curtain era – that threat causes bandwagoning to both sides which collapses heg and causes a reversion to the cold war. An unstable Russia cant adequately safeguard its nuclear power facilities or submarines and any of those could go instable at any time – old soviet tech increases the necessity for constant attention to be paid – turns blackotus and meltdowns. We’re impact turning energy wars

### 2NC—AT: Oil Not Key (New)

#### Oil prices key to the Russian economy

Schuman 12 (Michael, Asia and Economics Correspondent – TIME, B.A. in Asian History and Political Science – University of Pennsylvania, M.A. in International Affairs – Columbia University, “Why Vladimir Putin Needs Higher Oil Prices”, Time, 7-5, http://business.time.com/2012/07/05/why-vladimir-putin-needs-higher-oil-prices/, Deech)

But Vladimir Putin is not one of them. The economy that the Russian President has built not only runs on oil, but runs on oil priced extremely high. Falling oil prices means rising problems for Russia – both for the strength of its economic performance, and possibly, the strength of Putin himself. Despite the fact that Russia has been labeled one of the world’s most promising emerging markets, often mentioned in the same breath as China and India, the Russian economy is actually quite different from the others. While India gains growth benefits from an expanding population, Russia, like much of Europe, is aging; while economists fret over China’s excessive dependence on investment, Russia badly needs more of it. Most of all, Russia is little more than an oil state in disguise. The country is the largest producer of oil in the world (yes, bigger even than Saudi Arabia), and Russia’s dependence on crude has been increasing. About a decade ago, oil and gas accounted for less than half of Russia’s exports; in recent years, that share has risen to two-thirds. Most of all, oil provides more than half of the federal government’s revenues. What’s more, the economic model Putin has designed in Russia relies heavily not just on oil, but high oil prices. Oil lubricates the Russian economy by making possible the increases in government largesse that have fueled Russian consumption. Budget spending reached 23.6% of GDP in the first quarter of 2012, up from 15.2% four years earlier. What that means is Putin requires a higher oil price to meet his spending requirements today than he did just a few years ago. Research firm Capital Economics figures that the government budget balanced at an oil price of $55 a barrel in 2008, but that now it balances at close to $120. Oil prices today have fallen far below that, with Brent near $100 and U.S. crude less than $90. The farther oil prices fall, the more pressure is placed on Putin’s budget, and the harder it is for him to keep spreading oil wealth to the greater population through the government. With a large swath of the populace angered by his re-election to the nation’s presidency in March, and protests erupting on the streets of Moscow, Putin can ill-afford a significant blow to the economy, or his ability to use government resources to firm up his popularity.

#### Oil profits key to Russian economy --- controls 70% of export revenue

Aron 13 (Leon, Resident Scholar and Director of Russian Studies – American Enterprise Institute, Ph.D. – Columbia University, “The political economy of Russian oil and gas”, American Enterprise Institute, 5-29, http://www.aei.org/outlook/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/europe/the-political-economy-of-russian-oil-and-gas/, Deech)

From less than 50 percent in the mid-1990s,[14] the share of commodities in Russian exports has grown to 70 percent today, with oil accounting for more than half of the export income.[15] Representing up to 30 percent of the country’s GDP and half of its GDP growth since 2000,[16] hydrocarbons provided at least half of the state’s budget revenues last year.[17] Five years ago, Russia needed oil prices of $50 to $55 a barrel to balance its budget, but Alexei Kudrin, former first deputy prime minister and finance minister, estimated the breakeven price at $117 per barrel last year.[18] Russia’s dependence on energy exports—and, consequently, its economy’s vulnerability to commodity price fluctuation—was highlighted by the 2009 world financial crisis. As oil plunged from $147 to $34 per barrel, the resource-based economy contracted by almost 8 percent—the largest drop among the G20 top industrial nations. Russia has begun to exhibit the signs of what economists call the “Dutch disease,” when overreliance on commodity exports depresses other sectors of the economy by starving them of investments and modernization while the increasing value of the national currency makes exports of other goods and services more expensive and thus less competitive in world markets. Industrial stagnation has even spread to the military-industrial complex, which, like in Soviet times, continues to be the state’s favorite sector and enjoys its continuous and very generous support. Despite this, according to a recent survey, only 20 percent of the Russian defense enterprise qualified as “modern.”[19] As in virtually every other petro-gas state, the rise of the Russian one has been attended by corruption likely unprecedented even in the country’s far-from-pristine history. Venality and extortion have come close to subverting or even paralyzing governance, social institutions, justice, and entrepreneurial activity. In Transparency International’s 2012 Corruption Perception Index, Russia was 133rd among 176 countries, worse than Belarus, Vietnam, and Sierra Leone and on par with Honduras, Iran, and Kazakhstan.[20] Yet the most dangerous political legacy of the Russian petro-gas state is the centrality of oil and gas revenues, which amounted to $215 billion last year,[21] to the loyalty of two groups that are essential for the regime’s survival: the lower-income and elite segments. Trillion-ruble transfers help to maintain social peace in what is known as “Russia-2”[22]—poorer regions, especially the volatile and increasingly violent Muslim North Caucasus, small towns and rural areas, and the rusting “monotowns” (one-company towns) of Stalinist industrialization.[23]

#### Oil price drop annihilates the Russian economy

RIA Novosti 13 (“$60 Oil Price Will Eat up Russia’s Oil Fund – Survey”, 1-29, http://en.rian.ru/business/20130129/179108381.html, Deech)

MOSCOW, January 29 (RIA Novosti) – Russia’s Oil Wealth Fund will be totally consumed if world oil prices plunge to $60 per barrel and stay at that level for a year, experts from the Russian School of Economics (VSE) said on Tuesday. That scenario presents “a shock not only for the budget system but also for the economy as a whole,” experts from the Higher School of Economics' Development Center said in their stress-test survey. The stark warning echoes the Precarious Stability scenario outlined by former Russian Finance Minister Kudrin at the World Economic Forum at Davos last week, which predicted an oil price plunge to $60 per barrel, forcing the Russian government to preserve social stability at the expense of economic development. Last week's Davos forum was presented with three broadly pessimistic scenarios for Russia’s economic development, based on a poll of over 350 Russian and foreign economists and decision-makers who warned that the Russian economy remained acutely vulnerable to world energy prices and could become more risky for investment. World prices for benchmark Brent crude have been hovering at about $110 per barrel in recent months, a level Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said was optimal for both oil consumers and producers. Kudrin warned on Monday that the eurozone sovereign debt crisis was continuing and the global crisis could worsen as soon as the end of this year, which would certainly cause a plunge in demand for oil and hence oil prices. That could undermine the Russian economy, which continues to depend heavily on raw material exports. The Russian 2013 budget is based on an oil price of $97 per barrel. Aside from Oil Wealth Fund depletion, “Russia’s GDP would contract by 5.9 percent compared with 2012 while budget revenues [would fall] by 3 trillion rubles ($100 billion) or 23 percent,” the VSE Development Center survey said. “The budget deficit would widen to 3.5 trillion rubles (6.4 percent of GDP) and the ruble’s average yearly rate would fall to 35.5 rubles to the dollar in 2013.”

#### Any sustained drop below $100 per barrel causes Russian collapse --- that’s the key benchmark

Whitmore 13 (Brian, Senior Russia Correspondent – Radio Free Europe, “After The Storm: Trends To Watch In Russia In 2013”, Radio Free Europe, 1-2, The Power Vertical)

It began with a roar and it ended with a whimper. As 2012 wound down in Russia, the soaring expectations for change that accompanied the civic awakening and mass protests at the year’s dawn had clearly faded. But the social, economic, and political forces that spawned them will continue to shape the landscape well into the new year. A fledgling middle class remains hungry for political change, splits still plague the ruling elite over the way forward, and a fractious opposition movement continues to struggle to find its voice. With the Kremlin unable to decisively squelch the mounting dissent and the opposition unable to topple President Vladimir Putin, Russia has entered an uneasy holding pattern that has the feel of an interlude between two epochs. "I don't think we are at the end of the Putin era, but we are at the beginning of the end," says longtime Russia-watcher Edward Lucas, international editor of the British weekly "The Economist" and author of the recently published book "Deception." With economic headwinds on the horizon, generational conflict brewing, and new political forces developing, Russian society is changing -- and changing rapidly. But the political system remains ossified. So what can we expect in 2013? Below are several trends and issues to keep an eye on in the coming year. The Oil Curse: Energy Prices And The Creaking Welfare State If 2012 was all about politics, 2013 will also be about economics. The Russian economy, the cliche goes, rests on two pillars -- oil and gas. And both will come under increasing pressure as the year unfolds. World oil prices, currently hovering between $90 and $100 per barrel, are expected to be volatile for the foreseeable future. And any sharp drop could prove catastrophic for the Russian economy. Energy experts and economists say Russia's budget will only stay balanced if oil prices remain between $100 and $110 per barrel. Five years ago, the figure needed for a balanced budget was $50 to $55.

### 2NC—AT: Russian econ low/unsust

#### This isn’t a winning argument:

#### a) Russia’s economy hasn’t collapsed yet – even if it’s in terminal decline, it’ll be long-term and manageable. This means we control thesis-level uniqueness and their ev just creates a brink.

#### Recent policies like ending stimulus and targeting inflation are sufficient to ensure gradual which allows Russia to assume a diminished international role peacefully.

#### Even if Russia pursues adventurism, international pressure can deter aggression and de-escalate conflict – Georgia proves. Sudden instability short-circuits deterrence and makes interventionary pressure useless.

### 2NC Flood / AT: No Flood

#### Yes flood –

#### There’s an obvious financial incentive to make oil more appealing than [the aff] – short-term fluctuations don’t affect their economy because they have massive reserves and can use volumetric exports to China to make up their losses.

#### They love price manipulation

Fang et al 12 (Songying Fang, Ph.D. Assistant Professor of Political Science Rice University Amy Myers Jaffe Wallace S.Wilson Fellow in Energy Studies James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Rice University TedTemzelides, Ph.D. Rice Scholar. James a. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Professor of Economics. Rice University, “New Alignments? The Geopolitics of Gas and Oil Cartels and the Changing Middle East,” January, http://www.bakerinstitute.org/publications/EF-pub-GasOilCartels-012312.pdf)

Moreover, in light of new regional and internal challenges. Saudi Arabia is facing competing priorities with higher spending requirements on social services and defense. In an effort to respond to increased instability across the Middle East. King Abdullah ordered sweeping spending increases of $67 billion in March 2011 for housing, job creation, and the military, on top of a $36 billion handout to citizens in February. The pressure for higher defense and social spending will make it harder for the government to justify a massive campaign to expand its oil sector. It will not be as easy for Saudi Arabia to mobilize a major price war at this time."6

However, it would be premature to draw the conclusion that Saudi Arabia will no longer be willing to wage a price war. Its interest in carrying the spare capacity to wage a credible price war goes beyond its security relationship with the United States. Saudi Arabia gains international clout from its ability to guard the global economy by raising oil output and lowering oil prices. Moreover. Riyadh's ability to threaten other oil producers that it could flood the oil market is a critical aspect buttressing its leadership role inside OPEC and gives the country regional clout as well. Indeed, among the best levers Saudi Arabia has to influence regional politics is its ability to dramatically lower the price of oil. Saudi Arabia has flooded the oil market for geopolitical reasons in the past, and could arguably do so again. For example. Saudi Arabia has made it clear that it aims to draw the line against Iranian expansionism."' Iran is dependent on oil revenues for more than 65 percent of its government revenue. In contrast, the Kingdom is in a position to withstand a period of low oil prices. Thus. Saudi Arabia's ability to wage a price war is a major tool it can use to diminish Iranian power in the region and weaken Iran's position as a regional military and political rival to the Kingdom. The ability to wage an oil price war also helps the Kingdom to guard against other producers with large oil reserves, such as Iraq, from taking over its oil market share, hi fact. Iraq has expressed the ambition to reach 10 to 12 million b/d of production by 2017. This level is commensurate with Saudi Arabia's capacity. Rising Iraqi output could alter the balance of political power within OPEC and challenge Saudi Arabia's current leadership. Iraqi oil reserves are considered very low-cost to develop and are competitive with those of Saudi Arabia. In summary, while the costs of maintaining enough spare capacity to wage a price war have risen for Saudi Arabia, there are still many geopolitical incentives for the Kingdom to maintain this capability. This includes contributing to its security by weakening Iran and by remaining important to the United States, which would then be more apt to provide security guarantees in exchange for the free flow of oil."

#### The threat alone riggers the DA

Washington Times 04(OPEC Plan Spurs Drop in Oil Prices,” May 27, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/may/27/20040527-110406-8642r/?page=all>)

Signs that OPEC may move next week to aggressively increase oil production caused a plunge in oil prices yesterday, raising hopes that prices at the pump will follow.

The easing of oil prices comes amid evidence that record-high fuel costs have had little impact on the U.S. economy. Growth picked up to a strong 4.4 percent in the first quarter despite climbing fuel prices, the Commerce Department reported.

World leaders, in urging producers to pump more oil, have warned that high oil prices could start to hurt growth. But in the United States, the world's largest market for oil, the main impact so far has been to stoke inflation, which nearly tripled to a 3 percent rate from the fourth quarter of last year, Commerce said.

Crude oil prices dropped 3 percent to $39.44 per barrel in New York trading yesterday after the president of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries said the cartel is eyeing a "significant" increase in production to try to break the market psychology that has driven oil prices up to records near $42 per barrel this year.

An "option" at the cartel's June 3 meeting in Beirut "is to increase the quota significantly so it will bring a significant psychological impact to lower prices," Purnomo Yusgiantoro told reporters in Jakarta, Indonesia, where he is oil minister.

Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, who is traveling in Europe, predicted that OPEC would adopt the 2 million-barrel-a-day output increase recommended by Saudi Arabia last week.

Mr. Abraham said major non-OPEC producers like Mexico and Russia are scrambling to increase production to meet growing global demand for oil. Their efforts are expected to start paying off with substantial increases in oil supplies in 2005 and 2006.

But in the short run, only OPEC -- primarily Saudi Arabia -- is in a position to flood the market with oil.

Polls show the public does not blame OPEC or President Bush for high oil prices so much as "price gouging" by oil companies and the Iraq war.

A Gallup poll this week found that 22 percent of people interviewed blamed profiteering by big oil companies, and 19 percent blamed the war in Iraq. Only 9 percent held OPEC responsible, by contrast, while 5 percent blamed President Bush.

Analysts say prices could drop dramatically if OPEC -- which produces about a third of the world's oil -- were to succeed in breaking market psychology and forcing out speculators who have been betting on climbing oil prices.

Sung Won Sohn, chief economist at Wells Fargo & Co., said speculation centered on potential supply disruptions in the Middle East has driven up the price of oil by as much as one-third, or $10 to $15 a barrel.

Proof that hedge funds and other speculators are having a powerful influence on oil prices is seen in the trading patterns of oil futures contracts on the New York Mercantile Exchange.

Recently, contracts betting on further increases in oil prices outnumbered contracts betting on price decreases by four to one, Mr. Sohn noted.

That may be changing, however, as the number of contracts betting on price increases dropped by 15 percent in the week ended May 18, according to figures kept by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

Doug Leggate, an analyst at Citigroup Inc., said oil prices would be $10 lower, and could fall precipitously, if speculators dropped out of the market.

"Speculators have been driving the market since the end of the Iraq war," he said. Price drops could accelerate because speculators "follow momentum" and will quickly exit the market once upward price momentum fades, he said.

### 2NC – AT: Hegemony (empirics)

#### Empirics prove no impact to heg decline – that’s Fettweis:

#### a) Sequestration triggered their perception and drawback links but countries cut military spending – disproves adventurism.

#### b) Afghanistan and Iraq caused overstretch and tanked credibility – international backlash made achieving goals harder – proves we’ll use heg wrong if we have it.

#### c) No brink – 2008 recession proves either they’re wrong or the timeframe is massive.

#### Anglo-American transition proves

Parent 11—Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami—AND—Paul K. MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College (Joseph M., Spring 2011, International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00034, RBatra)

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, **periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone** than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition.93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism.94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two.95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness.96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation.

### 2NC – AT: Hegemony (i/l)

#### They don’t affect hegemony’s structural checks on war – that’s Maher:

#### a) Basing in Europe and Asia solves power projection– no drawdowns because of WW2 treaties.

#### b) Global institutions solve diplomacy which checks conflict and locks in stability for great powers who benefit from interdependence. Countries want strong relations with the US for protection.

#### c) Power disparity is sufficient – nuclear and naval deterrence solve escalation OR other countries are already ahead which means collapse is inevitable.

#### We’ll manage the transition which solves their impacts

Yi 9 [Xiaoxiong, professor of political science and director of the China Program at Marietta College, “American leadership in a non-polar world,” 12/30/09 http://www.zanesvilletimesrecorder.com/article/20091230/OPINION02/912300303]

In the coming "non-polar" world, no single power will run the show, nor will there be a group of powers such as China, India and Brazil as more or less "equal" powers with the United States, Japan and EU, managing the world system. Instead, the principal characteristic of non-polarity is that the world will be "influenced by dozens of state and non-state actors exercising various kinds of power," according to Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations. The emergence of a non-polar world can prove to be messy, complex and mostly negative. For one thing, as Haass points out, "more decision-makers make it more difficult to make decisions." The recent failure of world leaders to achieve a tough and binding greenhouse-gas reduction agreement in Copenhagen has brought into sharp focus a crisis of non-polarity. For another, without a uni-polar power center or a clearly defined multi-polar power structure, many of the most dangerous challenges we are facing today -- the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the genocide in Sudan and the surge in piracy off Somalia-will be hard to defuse or even contain. The consequences of the non-polarity may be dangerously destabilizing, but it is a mistake to conclude that a "growing vacuum of power" will inevitably lead to more conflict. Even in this emerging non-polar world, the United States remains to be the last guarantor of international security and global financial stability. There is simply no other alternative. In the coming decade, we can expect that power will continue to be diffused rather than concentrated in the world. But, as Richard Haass noticed, "This is not all bad news for the United States: the United States still retains more capacity than any other actor to improve the quality of the international system and Washington can still manage the transition and make the world a safer place." The challenge for the United States, however, is to understand the limits of America's reach and to embed America's hard power in a new form of "soft power" leadership. President Obama seems to have come to grasp with the essence of this emerging new world order -- that was perhaps why he was able to pull off what was possibly the only sensible deal in Copenhagen by working in tandem with the Chinese, Brazilian, Indian and South African leaders.

### 2NC – AT: DOD stuff

#### Status quo solves their internal link, but that doesn’t solve the impact – allies are dependent on oil which gives us a strategic incentive to intervene and pursue oil diplomacy regardless of the state of our energy needs. That means energy independence alone isn’t sufficient to make hegemony any more effective than it is now.

#### 1) SPR solves

Jaffe 13 Amy Myers Jaffe is executive director of energy and sustainability at University of California at Davis Graduate School of Management. She was formerly the director of the Energy Forum at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University. “An Oil Boom Means Washington—Not Riyadh—Could Become the World's Swing Oil Producer” Wall Street Journal. March 27, 2013. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324105204578382690249436084.html – clawan

For four decades, the geopolitical leverage achieved by large petro-exporting states has been a major challenge for the U.S. and its allies. Now, the rapid growth of oil and natural-gas production from unconventional shale resources in North America is rapidly eliminating this threat, with positive geopolitical implications for the U.S. As political uncertainty spreads across the Mideast, rising U.S. shale-oil production may become a more critical touchstone to market stability. In fact, the U.S. shale-oil boom might roll back the clock to the 1960s when a U.S. oil surplus (via the Texas Railroad Commission), put Washington, not Riyadh, as the world's swing producer. In a world where the U.S. will have few, if any, oil imports to replace during a global supply outage, Washington will have more discretion to use the Strategic Petroleum Reserve to help allies in times of crisis or to prevent oil producers from using energy cutoffs to achieve financial or geopolitical goals. U.S. oil and gas exports will also garner closer ties to allies and friendly countries through closer economic relations. A domestic oil and gas boom will also bring the US back to a stronger economic footing, possibly giving the country back some of the financial sway that previously allowed it to dominate international organizations like the United Nations and the World Bank. U.S. foreign aid and even energy exports could become a stronger counterpoint to continuing Chinese global investment. Beijing might also find soon that its overt policies of aiding problem states like Iran and Syria and thereby tying up the U.S. in conflicts across the Middle East will become more and more counterproductive over time as rising energy costs hit oil-import dependent China harder than an energy self-sufficient America.

#### 2) At worst – they get an 11% magnitude internal link

Green 7/12 (Miranda Green, 7/12/13; Reporter for The Daily Beast; Increasing Oil Production in the U.S. Sparks Less OPEC Reliance; http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/07/12/increasing-oil-production-in-the-u-s-sparks-less-opec-reliance.html)

The U.S. is often painted as an energy-strapped nation reliant on foreign countries for most of its oil use. But that picture is changing as the country gets closer to complete energy independence. A report issued this week shows that the U.S. is increasingly producing more crude oil inside of its borders. Production jumped last week to its highest level since January 1992, according to a recent report by the Energy Information Administration. In the week ended July 5, the U.S. produced 7.4 million barrels per day, up 1.8 percent from the previous week, and the highest weekly level in more than 20 years. The increase is largely attributed to more drilling and the sharp rise of hydraulic fracturing in the U.S. The controversial technique of fracturing, or fracking, involves drilling into rock formations to release oil embedded in shale. Many of the U.S. reserves of crude oil are found in the Midwest and along the plains region. Two of the largest reserves are the Bakken and Eagle Ford oilfields located in North Dakota and Texas, respectively. The increase of oil production in the U.S. is reversely driving down the amount of foreign oil the country is importing from OPEC countries because the fuel is less needed. Meanwhile, the U.S. is reducing its use of oil—thanks to more efficient vehicles, less driving, the use of natural gas as a transport fuel, and greater investments in renewable energy. Total liquid fuel consumption in the U.S. declined by 2.1 percent in 2012, according to the EIA, and is expected to rise by less than 1 percent in 2013. And that means the U.S. needs to import less oil—especially from OPEC countires. Numbers from the EIA report show that only 11 percent of the oil the U.S. used in March came from sources outside the U.S.

### AT: Energy diplo

#### No China lashout

Moss 2/10 (Trefor, Hong-Kong based journalist, The Diplomat: Asia-Pacific, February 10, 2013, “7 Reasons China and Japan Won’t Go To War,” <http://thediplomat.com/2013/02/10/7-reasons-china-and-japan-wont-go-to-war/>, alp)

Note – Shinzo Abe is the current prime minister of Japan

6. China’s policy of avoiding military confrontation. China has always said that it favors peaceful solutions to disputes, and its actions have tended to bear this out. In particular, it continues to usually dispatch unarmed or only lightly armed law enforcement ships to maritime flashpoints, rather than naval ships. There have been calls for a more aggressive policy in the nationalist media, and from some military figures; but Beijing has not shown much sign of heeding them. The PLA Navy made a more active intervention in the dispute this week when one of its frigates trained its radar on a Japanese naval vessel. This was a dangerous and provocative act of escalation, but once again the Chinese action was kept within bounds that made violence unlikely (albeit, needlessly, more likely than before). 7. China’s socialization. China has spent too long telling the world that it poses no threat to peace to turn around and fulfill all the China-bashers’ prophecies. Already, China’s reputation in Southeast Asia has taken a hit over its handling of territorial disputes there. If it were cast as the guilty party in a conflict with Japan –which already has the sympathy of many East Asian countries where tensions China are concerned – China would see regional opinion harden against it further still. This is not what Beijing wants: It seeks to influence regional affairs diplomatically from within, and to realize “win-win” opportunities with its international partners. Meanwhile, Abe is also pursuing diplomatic avenues. It was Abe who mended Japan’s ties with China after the Koizumi years, and he is now trying to reprise his role as peacemaker, having dispatched his coalition partner, Natsuo Yamaguchi, to Beijing reportedly to convey his desire for a new dialogue. It is hardly surprising, given his daunting domestic laundry list, that Xi Jinping should have responded encouragingly to the Japanese olive branch. In the end, Abe and Xi are balancing the same equation: They will not give ground on sovereignty issues, but they have no interest in a war – in fact, they must dread it. Even if a small skirmish between Chinese and Japanese ships or aircraft occurs, the leaders will not order additional forces to join the battle unless they are boxed in by a very specific set of circumstances that makes escalation the only face-saving option. The escalatory spiral into all-out war that some envisage once the first shot is fired is certainly not the likeliest outcome, as recurrent skirmishes elsewhere – such as in Kashmir, or along the Thai-Cambodian border – have demonstrated.

**Same with Iran**

**Hemmer 7**—Prof and Deputy Chair, Department of Intl Sec Studies, Air War College. PhD (Christopher, Responding to a nuclear Iran, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0IBR/is\_3\_37/ai\_n24325406/?tag=content;col1, AMiles)

America's overriding concern regarding Iran's nuclear weapons program is that these weapons are never used against the United States or its allies. Fortunately, the strategy of nuclear deterrence can go a long way in resolving this problem. The threat of annihilation as the result of an American retaliatory strike can be a powerful deterrent. As the United States and the Soviet Union discovered during the Cold War and as India and Pakistan have recently learned, the threat of nuclear retaliation makes the use of such weapons problematic. The central question in any debate over America's policies toward a nuclear Iran is whether or not the regime in Tehran is deterrable. If in fact it is, then deterrence is a less costly and risky strategy than prevention. Proponents of the preventive use of military force argue, as did the alarmists in the late 1940s with regard to the Soviet Union and in the early 1960s about China, that Iran is a revolutionary state seeking to export its destabilizing ideology. For these analysts Iran is often depicted as a regime of religious zealots that cannot be deterred because they are willing to accept an apocalyptic end to any conflict. (5) While Iran's track record with regard to its foreign policy does indicate a regime that is hostile to America, **nothing would indicate that Iran is beyond the realm of nuclear deterrence**. The bulk of the revolutionary fervor demonstrated by the Islamic Republic during its infancy died during the long war with Iraq. Moreover, the power of nuclear deterrence lies in the fact that precise calculations and cost and benefit analyses are not needed given the overwhelming costs associated with any nuclear exchange. Iranian leaders are rational enough to understand that any use of nuclear weapons against the United States or its allies would result in an overwhelming and unacceptable response. What about President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad talking of wiping Israel off the map or the former President Rafsanjani declaring that while Israel could not survive a nuclear war, the Islamic world could survive a nuclear exchange? Fears related to such rhetoric need to be viewed in a historical context. Similar arguments were made about the Soviets and Chinese as they developed their nuclear arsenals. The fear of many Cold War hawks was that the Kremlin was run by ideologues. Wasn't it a fact that they did not shirk while watching 25 million of their own killed in World War II; nor did they flinch while millions more were murdered in internal purges? This demonstrated, many argued, that the Soviet leadership would be impervious to the logic of mutually assured destruction. Indeed, at times Mao Tse-Tung offered strikingly similar rhetoric to that coming out of Tehran today. He also boasted about how China could afford to lose millions in a nuclear exchange and still emerge victorious. (6) Such worries turned out to be baseless with regard to the Soviets and the Chinese, and such **rhetoric** **proved to be just** that**, rhetoric**. While the bizarre views and hostile statements coming from Iran's current President are cause for concern, one must also be cognizant of the fact that **the President of Iran is not the commander**-in-chief **of the armed forces** and, in reality, has little influence over the nuclear program. The Supreme Leader does, however, and Ayatollah Ali Khameni has distanced himself from the most bellicose of Ahmadinejad's rhetoric. To counter these ominous tirades one could look to more reassuring statements, such as Supreme Leader Khameni's argument that nuclear weapons are un-Islamic. (7) More enlightening, however, than comparing dueling quotes, is an examination of what Iran has done in terms of its foreign policy. Iran has shown itself to be pragmatic in its actions to protect national interests, foregoing the activities one associates with a religiously driven revolutionary state. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, contrary to expectations, Iran did not seek to export its revolution to parts of the former Soviet Union, understanding that their national interest lay in forging a solid and profitable relationship with Russia. Iran even went so far as to dismiss the war in Chechnya as an internal Russian matter. Similar **calculations of national interests** led Iran to support Christian Armenia over Muslim Azerbaijan. Following the 1991 Gulf War, Iran did not push for a Shia revolution in Iraq, fearing that the outcome would probably be too dangerous and destabilizing. Following its isolation during the Iran-Iraq War Iran worked vigorously to improve relations with its Gulf neighbors. (8) But does Tehran's antipathy toward the United States and Israel outweigh its long-term national interests? No; indeed, during the Iran-Iraq War Tehran was willing to engage in arms shipments with the United States and Israel in an effort to further its war against Iraq. Given the difficulties the Iranians had with the Taliban, Tehran has also been fairly supportive of the American intervention in Afghanistan, to include offering the United States the use of its airfields and ports. (9) While Tehran was less supportive of America's subsequent intervention in Iraq, the leadership was astute enough to recognize the benefits associated with the destruction of Saddam Hussein's regime. The point of these examples is not to discount any policy differences that Washington has with Tehran, but to stress that Iran is not run by ideologues, rather by a group of pragmatists devoted to protecting Iranian interests. Leaders who are rational enough to understand that the use of nuclear weapons against America would not be in their national interests.

# 1NR

### Addon

#### Nafta solves

#### And no impact:

#### 1) Experts – no risk and counterterror increasing

Barry 13 (Tom, January 9, 2013, Director for the TransBorder project at the Center for International Policy in Wash. DC. “With the Resurrection of Immigration Reform We'll Hear a Lot About Securing Our Borders, But What Does It Really Mean?” http://www.alternet.org/immigration/resurrection-immigration-reform-well-hear-lot-about-securing-our-borders-what-does-it)

One likely reason the Border Patrol does not address its counterterrorism in any detail is that the agency’s border security buildup on the southwestern border has not resulted in the apprehension of members of foreign terrorist organizations, as identified by the State Department. Experts in counterterrorism agree there is little risk that foreign terrorist organizations would rely on illegal border crossings – particularly across the U.S.-Mexico border – for entry into the United States. While the fear that foreign terrorists would illegally cross U.S. land borders drove much of the early build-up in border security programs under the newly created homeland security department, counterterrorism seems to have dropped off the actual and rhetorical focus of today’s border security operations.

#### 2) Greencards – 9/11 proves

McCombs and Steller 11 – Columnists for AP (“Border seen as unlikely terrorist crossing point”, June 7th, 2011, <http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/border-seen-as-unlikely-terrorist-crossing-point/article_ed932aa2-9d2a-54f1-b930-85f5d4cce9a8.html>)

Over the last two decades, almost all of the known international terrorists arrested in the United States have come on legal visas or were allowed to come in without a visa, said Alden, of the Council on Foreign Relations. "These are people that come on airplanes," said Alden, author of "The Closing of the American Border," which explains how the U.S. revised visa and border policies in the wake of the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks. The 19 people involved in the Sept. 11 attacks entered the country on legal visas. And over the last four to five years, the terrorist plots have increasingly involved people already in the United States - citizens and legal residents, he said. "The notion of the (Southwest) border as the line that protects us from terrorism has really gone out of the window in the last several years," Alden said. Not only is the U.S. side of the border heavily guarded, but the Mexican government makes an extraordinary effort to prevent terrorists from coming through its country. For instance, Mexico shares real-time information with the U.S. about airline passengers arriving in Mexico to make sure they don't include potential terrorists, Alden said. The Mexican drug-smuggling organizations have no interest in allowing smuggling routes to be used by terrorist organizations either, he said. "If it is discovered that a terrorist that carried out an attack in the United States came across the Mexican border, then the response would be further fortification of that border that shuts down smuggling routes and cuts into the profits," he said. Being associated with terrorist groups would be very bad for business for drug-smuggling organizations, said Sylvia Longmire, a drug-war analyst and author. Proof of a terrorist coming through Mexico would have dire consequences for the Mexican government, too, she said. But that point of view ignores the fact that terrorist groups and Latin American drug smugglers sometimes do business with each other and therefore have connections, said Braun, the former DEA operations chief, who now runs a security-consulting firm, Spectre Group International. "Hezbollah is now heavily involved in the global cocaine trade," Braun said. "Most of the cocaine they're involved in distributing is heading toward Europe, but they're affiliating with the same cartels sending drugs to the United States." That isn't to say the groups share an ideology, but simply that they have the connections needed to exploit smuggling routes into the United States. Also, people from the Middle East tend to have dark hair, dark eyes and olive skin, like most Latin Americans, so they can easily blend in, he said. "On a moonless night at two in the morning, there's not a lot of due diligence going on when the coyotes and gatekeepers are moving human traffic across that border," Braun said. Canada is a more likely crossing point because that country allows in more people as refugees and asylum seekers, said Henry Willis, a senior policy researcher on homeland security at the Rand Corp. "To regard the Southwestern border as the 'frontline against terrorism,' as the Border Patrol does, is folly," wrote Barry, of the Center for International Policy, in a recent report. People have talked about terrorists crossing the U.S.-Mexico border, but Anthony Coulson, who retired as head of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Tucson office last year, has seen hardly any evidence. "Through the years I can probably count on my fingers on one hand the number of times that there was some type of terrorist activity associated with the border," Coulson said. "It just doesn't happen."

#### 3) Fearmongering

McCombs and Steller, 11 – Columnists for AP (“Border seen as unlikely terrorist crossing point”, June 7th, 2011, http://azstarnet.com/news/local/border/border-seen-as-unlikely-terrorist-crossing-point/article\_ed932aa2-9d2a-54f1-b930-85f5d4cce9a8.html)

A turning political tide has renewed fears that raged after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks - that terrorists will sneak into the country across the U.S.-Mexico border. Nobody disputes that's possible, but analysts and government officials say terrorists plotting to kill Americans are more likely to use other routes into the country, if they're not here already. It's much more common for people convicted in the U.S. of crimes connected to international terrorism to have been U.S. citizens or legal residents, or come into the country on visas. "There is no serious evidence that the U.S.-Mexico border is a significant threat from terrorism," said Edward Alden, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan think tank based in New York. Claims of terrorist threats on the Southwest border distract legislators and policymakers from addressing long-term solutions to drug smuggling and illegal immigration, said Tom Barry, senior analyst at the Center for International Policy in Washington. "It's politically motivated," Barry said, "playing on that sense of fear that certain people are susceptible to." But proponents of tougher border enforcement say protecting Americans against terrorism motivates them, not politics. "There's an enormous risk," said Michael Braun, who retired as chief of operations for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in 2008. Members of Hezbollah, for example, "are absolute masters at identifying existing smuggling infrastructures on many borders around the world where they operate." The State Department's 2009 "Country Reports on Terrorism" found that "no known international terrorist organizations had an operational presence in Mexico and no terrorist incidents targeting U.S. interests and personnel occurred on or originated from Mexican territory." The State Department said that there was no evidence of ties between Mexican organized crime and international terrorist groups. But it warns: "The violence attributed to organized-crime groups on the border, however, continued to strain Mexico's law-enforcement capacities, creating potential vulnerabilities that terrorists seeking access to the United States could exploit." Pinal County Sheriff Paul Babeu emphasized the risk of terrorists crossing the Mexican border into the U.S. in a May 26 open letter to President Obama. "If the majority of regular illegal immigrants can sneak into America, what does this say about the ability of terrorist sleeper cells?" Babeu wrote. "The porous U.S.-Mexican border is the gravest national-security threat facing America." Hiding in a car trunk In his letter to the president, Babeu said thousands of illegal immigrants hailing from "special-interest countries" make the U.S.-Mexico border a national-security threat. "In some cases, we have confirmed their troubling ties to terrorism," Babeu wrote. "Yet for those we apprehend, how many today live amongst us?" The Border Patrol apprehended an average of 339 people from "special-interest countries" - those that warrant special handling based on terrorism risk factors - at the U.S.-Mexico border each year over the past six years, Homeland Security data show. That's less than 1 percent each year of the total apprehensions along the U.S.-Mexico border, Homeland Security figures show. None of the 2,039 people arrested at the U.S.-Mexico border in that span presented a credible terrorist threat, Homeland Security officials say. Homeland Security monitors, analyzes and gathers intelligence about potential threats but at this time "does not have any credible information on terrorist groups operating along the Southwest border," said department spokesman Matt Chandler. Among the 36 people convicted by the U.S. Justice Department of charges relating to international terrorism last year, none came into the United States from Mexico. Half were U.S. citizens, most of them naturalized from countries such as Sudan or Somalia. Seven were extradited from other countries, while three were captured abroad by American forces. The others came to the United States on visas, or, in one case, were arrested while trying to come into the United States legally at a port of entry on the Canadian border.

#### Terrorists will go through Canada

Mora 11 (Edwin Mora, a economist, professor and pro-independence leader in Puerto Rico, “Canadian Border Bigger Terror Threat Than Mexican Border, Says Border Patrol Chief”, May 18 2011, CNS News, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/canadian-border-bigger-terror-threat-mexican-border-says-border-patrol-chief, //nikp)

The U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency has apprehended more suspected terrorists on the nation’s northern border than along its southern counterpart, CBP Commissioner Alan Bersin said Tuesday. “In terms of the terrorist threat, it’s commonly accepted that the more significant threat” comes from the U.S.-Canada border, Bersin told a hearing of the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and Border Security. Bersin attributed the situation, in part, to the fact that the U.S. and Canada do not share information about people placed on their respective “no-fly” lists. As a result, individuals deemed a threat who fly into one country may then cross the land border into the other. “Because of the fact that we do not share no-fly [list] information and the Canadians will not, we are more than we would like confronted with the fact where a [person designated as a] no-fly has entered Canada and then is arrested coming across one of our bridges into the United States,” he said. As it screens air travelers, the Department of Homeland Security’s Transportation Security Administration places individuals who are considered a threat to aviation on a no-fly list, which is a subset of the terrorist watchlist. Bersin’s comments came after the subcommittee’s ranking Republican, Sen. John Cornyn of Texas, asked him about the relative numbers of people apprehended along the northern and southern borders. He responded that the detentions and arrests along the border with Canada were “a small, small fraction” when compared to the number apprehended in the south. "That doesn’t mean that we don’t face significant threats” along the northern border, he added. CBP figures for fiscal year 2010 indicate that 447,731 illegal crossers were apprehended along the southwest border and 7,431 along the U.S.-Canada border. Cornyn noted during the hearing that the FY2010 arrests along the southwest border included 59,000 individuals from countries other than Mexico. Last March, the senator told a conference on border security that of those 59,000 people, 663 came “from special-interest countries like Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen and from countries that have been designated by the U.S. Department of State as state-sponsors of terror – Cuba, Iran, Syria, and Sudan.” Speaking to reporters after Tuesday’s hearing, Bersin said his agency has recorded more cases of people with suspected terrorist backgrounds or links to terror organizations entering the U.S. from Canada than from Mexico. “That doesn’t mean that we’re not looking for it on both borders, south and north,” he said. Bersin said people who are on the no-fly list for a variety of reasons may enter Canada, “because they’re entitled under Canadian laws to do so, and then they attempt to cross into the United States” by way of bridge or tunnel border crossings. “CBP officers have stopped that,” he said, but without quantifying the number of suspected terrorist arrests by CBP. Bersin told reporters Canadian authorities do not act on no-fly list information provided by the U.S. government if it affects a Canadian citizen. This, he said, creates a security gap. “Under the Canadian charter – as that’s been interpreted to me – they do not believe that they can accept information that would affect Canadian citizens, and therefore don’t. “But we’re constantly working with our Canadian partners to develop mechanism and modes of information exchange [so] that, as far as legally possible, we can close that gap. And we’ll continue to do that.” ‘Known presence of terrorist organizations’ A December 2010 report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that “the risk of terrorist activity is high” on the northern border. The report noted that according to the assessment of the U.S. Border Patrol – a component of CBP – only 32 of the nearly 4,000 miles of the U.S.-Canada border “had reached an acceptable level of control” in 2010. The rest, it said, were “defined as vulnerable to exploitation due to issues related to accessibility and resource availability and, as a result, there is a high degree of reliance on law enforcement support from outside the border zone.” The GAO report also noted that in the Blaine sector – the Border Patrol sector that includes Oregon and the western half of Washington state – there is a “known presence of terrorist organizations” near the border. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Director John Morton, who testified alongside Bersin Tuesday, told the Senate panel that his agency has about 1,500 enforcement and removal officers on the northern border – the “largest law-enforcement footprint of any U.S agency in Canada.” “We removed about 47,000 illegal aliens from the northern border region, roughly half of whom are criminal offenders,” added Morton. The issue of drug-smuggling over the northern border also came up during the hearing. In his prepared remarks, Bersin said that CBP interdicts around 40,000 pounds of illegal drugs each year at and between points of entry along the northern border.

### Ptx

**Trade solves the case**

**Dreier 11** – (David Dreier, 1/5/11, Politico, “Bipartisanship can revive economy,” http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/47044.html, JMP)

There are no higher priorities for our country right now than job creation and economic growth.

As the new Congress begins, every decision we make must be tied directly to those goals. If we are going to get our economy back on track, we need to take several key steps. These include making the current tax rates permanent, repealing the job-killing health care law and dramatically reducing federal spending.

Some of these efforts will divide Congress politically. But they are all a part of what House Republicans pledged we would do — and of what the American people expect us to do.

At the same time, there are areas in which both parties can work together. A strong trade agenda presents a unique opportunity to promote economic growth, **global partnerships** and bipartisan cooperation.

Unfortunately, the trade agenda has been allowed to languish for the past four years and, in some cases, has been thwarted. In the meantime, our economy and our global prestige have suffered. There’s never been a more important time to re-engage on trade.

Trade is often blamed for every manner of society’s ills. Globally connected commerce has been accused of having a hand in everything from terrorism to pandemics. In December, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez blamed it for the tragic mudslides that claimed dozens of lives in his nation and in Colombia.

Setting aside the disservice that such a claim does for addressing the true root causes of the great challenges we face, the reality of the role of trade is **precisely the opposite** of what this viewpoint presents. International trade plays an important part in improving a nation’s circumstances — far beyond the immediate scope of exports and imports.

Given the current climate, **the direct economic impact is the most urgent.** Opening up new markets for U.S. producers, farmers, service providers and investors is essential for spurring growth and creating new job opportunities for both union and nonunion workers here at home. The three markets with which we have pending free-trade agreements — Colombia, Panama and South Korea — represent 96 million consumers and $1.8 trillion in economic activity. **The opportunity for U.S. job creators is enormous**, so the delay in the agreements’ consideration is unjustifiable.

The benefits of trade, however, extend considerably beyond job creation and economic growth. Economic engagement across borders builds the **strong global partnerships** that are necessary to address the challenges of the 21st century. Whether the issue is tariffs or **nuclear proliferation,** the trust and spirit of collaboration forged through economic ties help the United States advance its interests and spread its values **around the globe.**

Enhancing prosperity through international trade also creates the resources necessary for **essential efforts like improving environmental quality, protecting human rights and building democratic institutions.** Raising living standards, in fact, helps alleviate many of society’s ills, including terrorism, pandemics and, yes, even the ability to respond to natural disasters in South America.

#### Trade leadership is key to U.S. hegemony and effective war on terror

Zoellick, 2k1 --- former U.S. Trade Representative (9/24/2001, Robert B., ““American Trade Leadership: What is at Stake,” http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/zoellick1001.pdf)

Earlier enemies learned that America is the arsenal of democracy; today’s enemies will learn that America is the economic engine for freedom, opportunity, and development. Economic strength – at home and abroad – is the foundation of America’s hard and soft power. To that end, U.S. leadership in promoting the international economic and trading system is vital. Trade is about more than economic efficiency. It promotes the values at the heart of this protracted struggle.

Lbl

### 2NC UQ

#### Will pass early this year --- but only if Obama is actively involved and prioritizes it.

#### Framing issue--- PC overcomes uniqueness shortfalls and proves that the link determines direction of DA

McGregor, 1/12 (Richard, 1/12/2014, “Democrats prove barrier for Obama in quest for trade deals,” <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fcc7adfe-7b9c-11e3-a2da-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2qgoMsIAV>))

Bill Reinsch, of the National Foreign Trade Council, which is in favour of more open markets, says estimates that about 50 Democrats in the House were ready to back TPA – enough to get it passed with Republican support – were overly optimistic.

“The administration is in the right place philosophically but there will need to some arm-twisting from the White House like there was with Nafta,” he said.

#### Prefer our ev

#### a. vote counts—most objective and quantifiable metric

Hadar, 1/7 (Leon --- Washington Correspondent, 1/7/2014, Business Times Singapore, “After a horrible 2013, what's next?” Factiva))

Global trade policy could also be another issue over which Republicans would be willing to work with Mr Obama and provide him with enough votes to win the approval of his Trade Promotion Authority, allowing him to move forward in advancing new historic free trade agreements with the Pacific Rim economies and with the European Union.

#### b. Trade experts are more qualified than random pundits

Hughes, 1/9 (Krista, 1/9/2014, Reuters News, “UPDATE 1-U.S. lawmakers propose fast-track bill for trade agreements,” Factiva))

National Foreign Trade Council President Bill Reinsch said he was confident that TPA would be approved but said he hoped the fight would not be as bitter as in 2001 and 2002, when it passed with a slim margin and only after last-minute concessions.

"What worries me about it is not that they won't get it done. What worries me about it is that it's going to end up being the same kind of nasty, partisan fight it was 13 years ago," he told reporters on Wednesday

#### Passage is favorable now --- Obama push critical

Gold, 1/9 --- president and CEO of Manufacturers Alliance for Productivity and Innovation (1/9/2014, Stephen, Penton Insight, “The Competitive Edge: Handicapping Manufacturers' Legislative Priorities in 2014,” Factiva))

Trade Promotion Authority. Between 1975 and 2008 all presidents enjoyed the flexibility of so-called “fast track” authority, which streamlines the trade negotiation process by allowing the White House to negotiate trade agreements without a threat of congressional amendment.

In December, Senate and House committee leaders on both sides of the aisle signed off on an agreement to support a TPA bill. Legislation should be introduced this month. The timing is important, because the White House has expressed an interest in pushing through negotiations in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Expect significant opposition from labor and environmental groups, as well as from intellectual property rights supporters. Also expect push-back from members of both parties because TPA precludes congressional input in both the transpacific and transatlantic trade agreements currently being considered. But considering the White House support for the policy, and long-standing Republican support, prospects for passage are favorable.

Odds for enactment: Even

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#### Obama’s push is critical --- he can gather sufficient support

Politi, 1/5 (James, 1/5/2014, “Obama challenge on selling trade deals to resurgent left,” <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ae053274-7604-11e3-b028-00144feabdc0.html>))

That shyness surrounding Mr Obama’s public pronouncements on trade may have to be shed soon.

In the next few weeks, the leaders of the Senate finance committee, who generally support Mr Obama’s trade policy, are expected to unveil legislation that would ensure a much smoother ride on Capitol Hill for trade deals.

Known as “Trade Promotion Authority”, this legislation could prove critical to ensuring the agreements do no get caught in political gridlock in Washington. This will be the first big political test for Mr Obama on trade – and it may take a much higher level of engagement from him to get it passed.

Mr Obama could succeed.

Liberal critics, including labour unions, remain unconvinced that the administration’s approach to the negotiations, particularly with regard to the more controversial Trans-Pacific Partnership, is really any different than what has been done in the past.

But they could still change their minds, or not fight as ardently as expected. And moderate, pro-trade Democrats may well come on board enthusiastically. Meanwhile, business groups will lobby feverishly for the deals.

In addition, geopolitical arguments rather than economic ones can help carry the day on Capitol Hill.

The TPP is seen as essential to Mr Obama’s “pivot to Asia” and could help bolster strategic ties with Japan and others to help contain China. The EU deal could revive transatlantic relations and help set new standards for global trade that may ultimately apply to emerging markets such as China in the future.

### 1NC

#### All energy policy drains capital and gets drawn into broader climate and budget fights – even unrelated policies with bipartisan support

Clean Energy Report, 11, (4/27, http://cleanenergyreport.com/Clean-Energy-General/Congress-Watch/bipartisan-plan-for-ccs-faces-new-obstacles-amid-political-tensions/menu-id-1003.html

Bipartisan Plan For CCS Faces New Obstacles Amid Political Tensions A leading bipartisan proposal to promote carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) projects, reintroduced from last Congress, may face several new obstacles this year because of partisan standoffs over the budget and EPA regulations to reduce greenhouse gases. That assessment may come as a surprise to those who expect progress on stand-alone bipartisan energy proposals from the 111th Congress after the dust settled from last year’s failed climate change legislation. These tensions pose a challenge for efforts by Senate Energy & Natural Resources Chairman Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) and ranking member Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) to move legislation reintroduced in March that would establish financial and regulatory support for up to 10 large-scale CCS projects. The situation may also color the deliberations of an Obama administration task force now seeking input on how to manage liability risks for CCS, an effort the coal industry says is crucial to ensuring the ultimate economic viability of CCS technology. Meanwhile, environmentalists are objecting to a pending EPA hazardous waste rulemaking that could conditionally exempt carbon dioxide (CO2) from certain hazardous waste disposal rules. The Senate energy committee in May is likely to hold hearings -- and possibly a markup -- of the Bingaman-backed legislation, which is essentially a reintroduction of a proposal that the committee approved in 2009. The latest proposal is also cosponsored by Sens. Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) and John Barrasso (R-WY). Both have criticized EPA climate rules, though Rockefeller opposes legislation backed by Barrasso that would largely strip the agency of its GHG authority The bill’s scope, however, is significantly less ambitious than the support CCS would have received under failed climate legislation from last year, which would have generated significant revenues for CCS and other low-carbon technologies. It is also narrower than legislation Rockefeller helped float in 2010 as a stand-alone measure, which included additional liability relief. Rockefeller’s future plans regarding his bill from last year remain unclear, with a Rockefeller spokesperson saying the senator is “reviewing his past legislation” on the issue. The question for proponents of CCS is not just whether the energy committee moves to embrace a bipartisan CCS proposal along the lines of the reintroduced package, but whether any plan can garner broad enough support to pass both chambers in a tough budget and political climate, observers say. Enter environmentalists, who are beginning to argue that mounting legislative attacks on EPA’s greenhouse gas (GHG) authority could make enactment of CCS provisions even more difficult. While environmental groups have historically split on the merits of CCS, sources from both sides of the debate are citing attacks on EPA as a new reason why the community as a whole may be more inclined to resist CCS or be less likely to speak out on its behalf. “You’ve got to have some momentum and cooperative process” to move forward on energy and environment policy, one environmentalist says. “That doesn’t just show up on its own,” the source adds, contending that the attacks on EPA are “sucking up all the oxygen.”

### Link Wall

#### Economic engagement with Mexico is politically divisive

Wilson 13 – Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, t he choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

**Fiat doesn’t solve the link—the plan passes through the least necessary means which still**

### 2NC Intrinsicness

**Counterinterp–judge is a citizen**

**It is intrinsic—the government isn’t a monolith—link proves policymakers take political considerations into account**

**Intrinsicness is a voting issue – neg ground – they can solve all disads – forces impact turn debates that kill specific research**

### AT: W/W—Dickerson

Still links – destroys all leverage

**A) Not a win—the plan’s an unrelated bill—not Obama’s agenda**

**B) Not applicable to our scenario—Obama must sequence with putting TPA on top for it to pass—adding any other controversy will derail it—that’s Schneider**

**C) Illogical—if winners win were true, Obama wouldn’t have lost after his first win**

**C) First term proves—prefer empirics by scholars—key to understand political precedents**

**Calmes 12** (Jackie, International Herald Tribune, “Obama looks to budget talks as an opportunity to take control of agenda; News Analysis,” 11/13/2012, Factiva, CMR)

Whether Mr. Obama succeeds will reveal much about what kind of president he intends to be in his second term. Beyond the specifics of any accord, perhaps the bigger question hanging over the negotiations is whether Mr. Obama will go to his second inaugural in January with an achievement that starts to rewrite the unflattering leadership narrative that, fairly or not, came to define his first term for many people.¶ That story line, stoked by Republicans but shared by some Democrats, holds that Mr. Obama is too passive and deferential to Congress, a legislative naïf who does little to nurture personal relationships with potential allies — in short, not a particularly strong leader. Even as voters re-elected Mr. Obama, those who said in surveys afterward that strong leadership was the most important quality for a president overwhelmingly chose Mr. Romney.¶ George C. Edwards III, a **leading scholar of the presidency** at Texas A&M University who is currently teaching at Oxford University, dismissed such criticisms as shallow and generally wrong. Yet Mr. Edwards, whose book on Mr. Obama’s presidency is titled ‘‘Overreach,’’ said, ‘‘He didn’t understand the limits of what he could do.’’**¶** ‘‘They thought they could continuously create opportunities and they would succeed, and then there would be more success and more success, and we’d build this advancing-tide theory of legislation,’’ Mr. Edwards said. ‘‘And that was **very naïve, very silly**. Well, they’ve learned a lot, I think.’’¶ ‘‘Effective leaders,’’ he added, **‘‘exploit opportunities rather than create them.’’**

#### D) PC’s not renewable, is zero-sum, regenerates too slowly, and regeneration fails in practice

Ryan 9 Selwyn, Professor Emeritus and former Director, Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, “Obama and political capital,” 1/18 http://www.trinidadexpress.com/index.pl/article\_opinion?id=161426968

Like many, I expect much from Obama, who for the time being, is my political beast of burden with whom every other politician in the world is unfavourably compared. As a political scientist, I however know that given the structure of American and world politics, it would be **difficult for him to deliver half of what he has promised**, let alone all of it. Reality will **force him to make many "u" turns** and detours which may well land him in quick sand. Obama will, however, begin his stint with a **vast accumulation of political capital**, perhaps more than that held by any other modern leader. Seventy-eight per cent of Americans polled believe that his inauguration is one of the most historic the country will witness. Political capital is, however, a lumpy and **fast diminishing asset** in today's world of instant communication, which once misspent, is **rarely ever renewable**. The world is full of political leaders like George Bush and Tony Blair who had visions, promised a lot, and probably meant well, but who **did not know how to husband** the **political capital** with which they were provided as they assumed office. They squandered it as quickly as they emptied the contents of the public vaults. Many will be watching to see how Obama manages his assets and liabilities register. Watching with hope would be the white young lady who waved a placard in Obama's face inscribed with the plaintive words, "I Trust You." Despite the general optimism about Obama's ability to deliver, many groups have already begun to complain about being betrayed. Gays, union leaders, and women have been loud in their complaints about being by-passed or overlooked. Some radical blacks have also complained about being disrespected. Where and when is Joshua going to lead them to the promised land, they ask? When is he going to pull the troops out of Iraq? Civil rights groups also expect Obama to dis-establish Guantanamo as soon as he takes office to signal the formal break with Dick Cheney and Bush. They also want him to discontinue the policy which allows intelligence analysts to spy on American citizens without official authorisation. In fact, Obama startled supporters when he signalled that he might do an about-turn and continue this particular policy. We note that Bush is signalling Obama that keeping America safe from terrorists should be his top priority item and that he, Bush, had no regrets about violating the constitutional rights of Americans if he had to do so to keep them safe. Cheney has also said that he would do it again if he had to. The safety of the republic is after all the highest law. Other groups-sub-prime home owners, workers in the automobile sector, and the poor and unemployed generally all expect Obama to work miracles on their behalf, which of course he cannot do. Given the problems of the economy which has not yet bottomed out, **some promises have to be deferred** beyond the first term. Groups, however, expect that the promise made to them during the campaign must be kept. Part of the problem is that almost every significant social or ethnic group believes that it was instrumental in Obama's victory. White women felt that they took Obama over the line, as did blacks generally, Jews, Hispanics, Asians, rich white men, gays, and young college kids, to mention a few of those whose inputs were readily recognisable. Obama also has a vast constituency in almost every country in the world, all of whom expect him to save the globe and the planet. Clearly, he is the proverbial "Black Knight on a White Horse." One of the "realities" that Obama has to face is that **American politics is not a winner-take-all system**. It is pluralistic vertically and horizontally, and getting **anything done politically**, even when the President and the Congress are controlled by the same party, **requires groups to negotiate, bargain and engage in serious horse trading.** No one takes orders from the President who can only use moral or political suasion and promises of future support for policies or projects. The system was in fact deliberately engineered to prevent overbearing majorities from conspiring to tyrannise minorities. The system is not only institutionally diverse and plural, but socially and geographically so. As James Madison put it in Federalist No 10, one of the foundation documents of republicanism in America, basic institutions check other basic institutions, classes and interests check other classes and interests, and regions do the same. All are grounded in their own power bases which they use to fend off challengers. The coalitions change from issue to issue, and there is no such thing as party discipline which translated, means you do what I the leader say you do. Although Obama is fully aware of the political limitations of the office which he holds, he is fully aware of the vast stock of political capital which he currently has in the bank and he evidently plans to enlarge it by drawing from the stock held by other groups, dead and alive. He is clearly drawing heavily from the caparisoned cloaks of Lincoln and Roosevelt. Obama seems to believe that by playing the all-inclusive, multipartisan, non-ideological card, he can get most of his programmes through the Congress without having to spend capital by using vetoes, threats of veto, or appeals to his 15 million strong constituency in cyberspace (the latent "Obama Party").

**E) Balance key—confrontation poisons the well—kills consensus**

**Goldfarb 13** (Zachary A. Goldfarb and Rosalind Helderman, “Obama makes his immigration push,” 1/29/2013, “http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-unveils-his-own-proposal-for-immigration-reform/2013/01/29/b27dcb78-6a47-11e2-95b3-272d604a10a3\_story.html, CMR)

LAS VEGAS — President **Obama** on Tuesday **put the weight of his administration behind efforts to pass legislation allowing many of the nation’s 11 million illegal immigrants to earn citizenship, seeking to build on a rapidly shifting political consensus around the issue.**¶ Obama dedicated the first trip of his second term to calling for an overhaul of immigration laws, making clear that it is one of his top domestic priorities. The president — who has said that not passing an overhaul in his first term was his biggest failure — also suggested he has little patience for Congress and would demand that lawmakers vote on his more permissive plan if they do not swiftly pass their own.¶ “Now is the time,” Obama said, eliciting chants of “Si, se puede” — roughly translated as “Yes, it’s possible” — from the crowd at a majority Hispanic high school here. “We can’t allow immigration reform to get bogged down in an endless debate.”¶ **Fresh off a decisive reelection, Obama is seizing this moment as one in which both sides could** come together **to address widespread anxieties within rising demographic groups**, particularly Hispanics and Asian Americans.¶ But obstacles still loomed large Tuesday on Capitol Hill, fueled by continued unease among conservative Republicans over going too far to loosen immigration restrictions. One of the biggest disputes centers on whether illegal immigrants would have to wait to seek a green card — the first step to full citizenship — until the U.S. border with Mexico is secure and other enforcement measures are in place.¶ A bipartisan Senate plan released Monday would tie the possibility of citizenship to several such enforcement measures, including a system to verify the immigration status of employees. The president did not comment explicitly on that proposal in his speech, but the administration suggested in its own guidelines released Tuesday that it does not want to link the citizenship process to other goals.¶ “It must be clear from the outset that there is a pathway to citizenship,” Obama said, adding that the administration has made great strides in an effort to toughen enforcement.¶ Some key Republicans expressed concern with any approach that does not link border security with the proposal to offer illegal immigrants a way to become citizens.¶ “Without such triggers in place, enforcement systems will never be implemented and we will be back in just a few years dealing with millions of new undocumented people in our country,” said Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), a potential 2016 presidential candidate and one of eight senators who signed on to the bipartisan framework.¶ Another set of pitfalls awaits in the House, where many Republicans are deeply skeptical of any legislation that they believe might be overly generous to illegal immigrants.¶ “There are a lot of ideas about how best to fix our broken immigration system,” said Brendan Buck, a spokesman for House Speaker John A. Boehner (R-Ohio). “We hope the president is careful not to drag the debate to the left and ultimately disrupt the difficult work that is ahead in the House and Senate.”¶ **No White House bill yet**¶The White House had considered releasing its own legislation to overhaul the immigration system, but Obama said it would not immediately do so. **The president and his aides have long worried that by simply endorsing a position, Obama could** turn Republicans against a proposal **they otherwise might support.**¶Obama said the Senate framework is “very much in line with the principles I’ve proposed and campaigned on for the last few years.” But — in keeping with the more muscular approach he has taken in other recent debates — Obama also made clear he would not wait long.¶ “If Congress is unable to move forward in a timely fashion, I will send up a bill based on my proposal and insist that they vote on it right away,” he said.¶ Just a year ago, during a Republican presidential primary season dominated by tough talk on immigration, it seemed implausible that legislation to address the issue could muster support. But many Republicans have shifted rapidly on the issue since the November election, when Obama won more than 70 percent of votes from Latinos and Asian Americans.¶ Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), Obama’s 2008 opponent, said he was “cautiously optimistic” that the two sides could reach a deal.¶ “While there are some differences in our approaches to this issue, we share the belief that any reform must recognize America as a nation of laws and a nation of immigrants,” said McCain, who spearheaded a failed 2007 immigration overhaul effort before emphasizing tough border positions during his 2010 reelection.¶ The senators have said they want to draft a bill by the end of March and pass it through the Senate by the summer, striking quickly while there is momentum on the issue.¶ But aides acknowledge there are dozens of questions they must answer before they can come forward with legislation. For example, what measurements will be used to determine if border security has been improved sufficiently to allow illegal immigrants to pursue full citizenship? How large a fine would be required to get probationary legal residency? How would a temporary-worker program operate?¶ Under Obama’s plan, illegal immigrants seeking citizenship would register, submit biometric data, pass background checks and pay fees before gaining provisional legal status, according to a White House summary. After taking those steps and learning English, the immigrants would wait in line for existing immigration backlogs to clear before being allowed to apply for permanent resident status, which immigrants must hold before they can apply for citizenship.¶ Children brought to the United States illegally would be eligible for an expedited process if they go to college or serve in the military for at least two years. The plan would also allow citizens and permanent residents to seek a visa for a same-sex partner — an idea opposed by many religious groups and one that went unmentioned by Obama in his Tuesday speech.¶ “It won’t be a quick process, but it will be a fair process,” Obama said Tuesday in Nevada, which is 27 percent Hispanic.¶ ‘Us versus them’ dynamic¶ The president, the son of a Kenyan man and an American woman, also sought to remind the audience of immigration’s central role in the nation’s history.¶ “When we talk about that in the abstract, it’s easy sometimes for the discussion to take on a feeling of ‘us versus them,’ ” Obama said. “And when that happens, a lot of folks forget that most of ‘us’ used to be ‘them.’ ”¶ Obama, who will take his case to the Spanish-language Univision and Telemundo networks on Wednesday, said his principles for immigration reform also include strengthening border security and cracking down more forcefully on businesses that knowingly hire illegal workers.¶ Immigration advocates reacted enthusiastically.¶ **“The president faced a tough situation on how to encourage the bipartisan process without becoming hostage to it,” said** Frank **Sharry, executive director of America’s Voice, an advocacy group. “As someone who has been concerned and hoping he would be aggressive, I thought he did strike the right tone.”**

#### F) Velcro—Only blame sticks

Nicholas & Hook 10 Peter and Janet, Staff Writers---LA Times, “Obama the Velcro president”, LA Times, 7-30, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/30/nation/la-na-velcro-presidency-20100730/3

If Ronald Reagan was the classic Teflon president, Barack **Obama is made of Velcro**.¶ Through two terms, Reagan eluded much of the responsibility for recession and foreign policy scandal. In less than two years, Obama has become **ensnared in blame**.¶ Hoping to better insulate Obama, White House aides have sought to give other Cabinet officials a higher profile and additional public exposure. They are also crafting new ways to explain the president's policies to a skeptical public.¶ But Obama remains **the colossus of his administration** — to a point where trouble anywhere in the world is often his to solve.¶ The president is on the hook to repair the Gulf Coast oil spill disaster, stabilize Afghanistan, help fix Greece's ailing economy and do right by Shirley Sherrod, the Agriculture Department official fired as a result of a misleading fragment of videotape.¶ **What's not sticking to Obama is a legislative track record that his recent predecessors might envy. Political dividends from passage of a healthcare overhaul or a financial regulatory bill have been fleeting.¶** Instead, voters are measuring his presidency by a more immediate yardstick: Is he creating enough jobs? So far the verdict is no, and that has taken a toll on Obama's approval ratings. Only 46% approve of Obama's job performance, compared with 47% who disapprove, according to Gallup's daily tracking poll.¶ "I think the accomplishments are very significant, but I think most people would look at this and say, 'What was the plan for jobs?' " said Sen. Byron L. Dorgan (D-N.D.). "The agenda he's pushed here has been a very important agenda, but it hasn't translated into dinner table conversations."

**G) Rebuilding takes too long**

**Lashof ’10** (Dan Lashof, director of the National Resource Defense Council's climate center, Ph.D. from the Energy and Resources Group at UC-Berkeley, 7-28-2010, NRDC Switchboard Blog, "Coulda, Shoulda, Woulda: Lessons from Senate Climate Fail," <http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/dlashof/coulda_shoulda_woulda_lessons.html>, CMR)

Lesson 2: **Political capital is not necessarily a renewable resource**. Perhaps the most fateful decision the Obama administration made early on was to move healthcare reform before energy and climate legislation. I’m sure this seemed like a good idea at the time. Healthcare reform was popular, was seen as an issue that the public cared about on a personal level, and was expected to unite Democrats from all regions. White House officials and Congressional leaders reassured environmentalists with their theory that success breeds success. A quick victory on healthcare reform would renew Obama’s political capital, some of which had to be spent early on to push the economic stimulus bill through Congress with no Republican help. Healthcare reform was **eventually enacted**, but only after **an exhausting battle** that eroded public support, **drained political capital** and created the Tea Party movement. Public support for healthcare reform is **slowly rebounding** as some of the early benefits kick in and people realize that the forecasted Armageddon is not happening. But this is occurring **too slowly to rebuild Obama’s political capital** in time to help push climate legislation across the finish line.

### AT W/W—AT: Hirsh

#### context immigration

#### TPA will pass—PC key

Parnes, 1/21 (Amie, 1/21/2014, “Obama: Give me fast track trade,” <http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/195858-white-house-works-to-convince-dems-to-give-obama-fast-track-on-trade>

#### Issue selection is key --- he can only get momentum if he starts with an issue like immigration where the public mood is changing. Overreaching with an unpopular issue empirically triggers backlash.

Hirsh, 13 --- Chief correspondent (2/7/2013, Michael, “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital; The idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207)>)

Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories.¶ In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win, and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of political capital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction.¶ Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. If he can get some early wins—as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—that will create momentum, and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.”

#### AND, Sequencing – unpopular policies ruin the agenda– Obama’s entire first term proves

Hirsh, 13 --- Chief correspondent (2/7/2013, Michael, “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital; The idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207)>)

.¶ THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER¶ Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood.¶ Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said.

#### Obama’s leadership is the critical variable to ensure passage --- winning GOP support is key

Hill, 12/23 (Patrice, 12/23/2013, The Washington Times, “Congress puts Obama on tough road for fast-track trade deals,” Factiva))

President Obama has stepped up efforts to negotiate far-reaching trade deals with Asia and Europe in his second term, but he faces an uphill battle next year in Congress to gain the same authority his predecessors had to finalize such agreements.

Without "fast-track" authority, many trade analysts say, Mr. Obama's hopes to enact trade deals before he leaves office may be doomed. They say longtime opposition to freer trade among congressional Democrats and wariness among some Republicans about giving Mr. Obama such sweeping authority endanger legislation in what could be a cliffhanger vote early next year.

The chairmen of the House and Senate tax-writing committees are negotiating a bipartisan bill to revive fast-track authority, which expired in the seventh year of George W. Bush's presidency.

Fast-track authority restricts Congress to an up-or-down vote on any presidentially negotiated trade agreements with no opportunity to change them. Trade analysts say no other major country would be willing to negotiate concessions if they knew Congress could amend what is considered to be their final deal.

Mr. Obama must navigate difficult political waters to regain fast- track power.

Ralph Nader's Public Citizen group, a leading member of the powerful progressive coalition of labor unions and environmentalists opposed to the legislation, has declared it dead on arrival, based on evidence that at least 25 House Republicans and 151 Democrats will vote against it in the 435-member House, where 218 votes are needed to pass.

As in years past, the president will have to rely heavily on Republicans and a smattering of centrist Democrats to win fast- track authority. But that coalition has been frayed by distrust of Mr. Obama among tea party and other conservative groups - one among many signs that the traditional Republican enthusiasm for free trade is waning among the party's more populist elements.

The fast-track fight is becoming even more urgent as Mr. Obama has entered into two of the most ambitious free trade accords in years: the Trans-Pacific Partnership with 11 other Pacific Rim countries (and possibly two more) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with 28 members of the European Union.

"President Obama must seek to win substantial Republican support" if he hopes to get fast-track authority and win approval of a trans- Pacific trade agreement next year, and he will have to act quickly early in the year, said Scott Miller, an analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Polls show declining public support for free trade agreements, which can be difficult even for legislators who believe in opening markets. To avoid the pitfalls of election politics, "the president needs to make this issue his own and exert leadership to get the bill enacted before summer 2014, when the election season kicks into high gear," Mr. Miller said.

Asian deal in doubt

The lack of fast-track authority has undermined the administration's effort to secure the Asian trade deal before the end of this year - a goal once espoused by proponents, Mr. Miller said. Other parties to the treaty among nations around the thriving Pacific region - including Vietnam, Canada and Japan - have been wary about making concessions and sensitive trade-offs when Congress could reject, reopen or pick apart the deal under ordinary legislative procedures, Mr. Miller said.

"Given the skepticism of the other parties about the U.S. ability to deliver on its commitments, a final agreement is unlikely" unless Congress first passes Trade Promotion Authority, as the fast-track bill is formally called in Congress, he said.

A defeat of fast-track legislation could deal a debilitating blow to the trans-Pacific deal, which is "at the heart of the administration's rebalancing strategy" toward Asia, and would seriously damage Mr. Obama's second-term trade and diplomatic agenda, Mr. Miller said.

"Beyond the lost economic opportunities, lack of a TPP agreement would feed perceptions in Asia that the rebalance is mainly about military positioning," he said. "It would also raise questions about the U.S. ability to champion the rules of the road in economic affairs."

After giving only tepid support to free trade in his first term, Mr. Obama has embraced fast-track legislation. He hopes to expand trade to support his "pivot to Asia" and to achieve his goals of strengthening the U.S. manufacturing sector and doubling exports. Although exports have been stellar during the economic recovery, growing by 35 percent since the recession and recently exceeding pre- recession levels, they have far from doubled.

#### TPA passage will require bipartisan coalition

Inside U.S. Trade, 12/13 (“Camp Sees Fast-Track Vote 'Early Next Year' If Administration Engages,” 12/13/2013, Vol. 31, No. 49, Factiva))

**\*\*\*Note --- Rep. Ron Kind (D-WI)**

Kind also emphasized that a fast-track bill will face opposition in Congress from both sides of the aisle, not just Democrats. "I also don't discount the challenge we have with some of our Republican colleagues on this issue, to be quite honest," Kind said in a Dec. 11 press conference. "So it's gonna require a good bipartisan coalition to come together to make this happen."

#### Obama’s capital and cooperation with Republicans are key to ensuring passage of TPA

WSJ, 11/18 (“Obama's Trade Jeopardy; A bipartisan revolt threatens his main pro-growth policy,” 11/18/2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304243904579196203165156712))

President Obama's second-term agenda is in tatters, and now his declining clout is jeopardizing a rare pro-growth proposal—freer trade with Asia and Europe. He needs to spend political capital to head off a bipartisan revolt on Capitol Hill.

The revolt comes in the form of left-right opposition to Mr. Obama's request for Trade Promotion Authority, which allows the President to submit an agreement for a straight up-or-down vote. Also known as "fast-track" authority, this is essential to passing the separate trade accords that Mr. Obama is negotiating with 38 nations on the Pacific Rim and with the European Union. Countries aren't about to trade concessions with the U.S. if they think Congress can rewrite a deal.

The revolt on the left is led by House Democrats Rosa DeLauro of Connecticut and George Miller of California, who are close friends of Big Labor. They've collected more than 150 Democratic signatures on a letter warning that they'll "oppose 'fast-track' trade promotion authority or any other mechanism delegating Congress's constitutional authority over trade policy that continues to exclude us." That's more than three of four Members of the President's own party in the House.

They want to transform trade policy into "a tool for creating and retaining family-wage jobs in America, safeguarding the environment, maintaining consumer protection"—i.e., to impose the labor and environmental agenda that liberals can't pass legislatively. These are intended to be poison pills.

As ominously, a pair of Republicans, Minnesota's Michele Bachmann and North Carolina's Walter Jones Jr. , have gathered 23 House Republican signatures on a letter claiming that the Constitution's Commerce Clause gives Congress exclusive authority to regulate trade. They must be reading "The Constitution for Dummies."

The real Constitution clearly empowers the President to propose and negotiate agreements with foreign countries, which Congress can vote down. Trade promotion authority merely streamlines the process for passing an agreement through Congress.

Presidents of both parties have used such authority to pass numerous trade deals, including Bill Clinton with Nafta. Congress last renewed fast-track authority in 2002, and it let President Bush wrap up pacts with Chile, Singapore, Australia and Peru. Mr. Obama also benefited because the free-trade agreements with Colombia, Panama and South Korea, which Congress approved in 2011, were initiated and thus grandfathered before the authority's 2007 sunset.

Trade agreements are often difficult to pass, as local or regional interests pressure Congress. That's why a President has to lead by explaining the national interest. Bill Clinton did this with regularity, making the case that trade was vital to American prosperity.

Mr. Obama has rarely mentioned trade in his speeches, and he hasn't reached out to House Republicans who will have to provide most of the free-trade votes. Instead, he's left Senate Finance Chairman Max Baucus and House Ways and Means Chairman David Camp to thread the needle between unions that oppose free trade and tea partiers who are suspicious of the President.

As for Republicans, distaste for Mr. Obama isn't enough to justify opposition to trade pacts that would raise U.S. living standards. This is something Newt Gingrich understood in the 1990s working with Mr. Clinton, and Speaker John Boehner has continued the bipartisan tradition. Without trade promotion authority, the U.S. will be a bystander as the rest of the world steals jobs from America.

Negotiating a trade agreement is impossible if 535 Members of Congress get a chance to rewrite it. Mr. Obama needs to build a bipartisan free-trade coalition, and one place to start would be to stop demonizing the House Republicans whose votes he's going to need.